Would a 'Cyber Warrior' Protect Us? Exploring Trade-offs Between Attack and Defense of Information Systems

About

As information security shifts from the realm of computer science to national security, the priority for safe and secure systems will be balanced against the appeal of using information insecurity as a strategic asset. In "cyber war", those tasked with defending friendly computer networks are also expected to exploit enemy networks. This seminar presents two game-theoretic models of vulnerability discovery and exploitation, where nations must choose between protecting themselves by sharing vulnerability information with vendors or pursuing an offensive advantage while remaining at risk. One game describes a cold war of stockpiling, the other allows for actual attack. In both models, we predict that at least one state will have an incentive to pursue an aggressive cyber war posture, rather than secure its own systems. This finding — that a mutually defensive approach to security is not a stable equilibrium — holds up under a range of assumptions about social risk of cybercrime, technical sophistication, military aggressiveness and the likelihood of vulnerability rediscovery. The seminar will conclude with a discussion of the security policy implications of a militarized cyberspace.

(This talk is based on joint work with Tyler Moore and Ariel Procaccia.)

Everyone is welcome—no RSVP required!