AI Cyber Lunch: Anne Boustead on "Measuring Encryption"

Open to the Public

Law enforcement argues that "warrant-proof" encrypted devices and communications can hinder the investigation of serious criminal activities, but civil liberties and technology policy groups say that undermining consumer encryption threatens privacy, cybersecurity, and human rights. But what do the empirical data say?

Please join the Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program and HKS Library and Research Services for an AI Cyber Lunch Seminar featuring Anne Boustead, Assistant Professor at the School of Government and Public Policy at the University of Arizona. In a talk entitled, "Measuring Encryption," Boustead will explore some of the legal and policy issues that could be informed by additional data on encounters with encrypted devices in the criminal justice system.

Q&A to follow. Buffet-style lunch will be served.

Registration: In-person attendance is limited to current Harvard ID holders. No RSVP is required. Room capacity is limited and seating will be on a first come, first served basis. All are welcome to attend virtually via Zoom. Virtual attendees should register using the button below; upon registering, attendees will receive a confirmation email with a Zoom link.

Recording: Please be advised that this seminar will not be recorded. The event organizers prohibit any attendees, including journalists, from audio/visual recording or distributing parts or all of the event program without prior written authorization.

Accessibility: To request accommodations or for questions about access, please contact Liz Hanlon (ehanlon@hks.harvard.edu) in advance of the session.

Date: Wed, Nov 8, 2023 Time: 12:00pm - 01:00pm Location: Rubenstein Building - David T. Ellwood Democracy Lab, Room 414AB

Abstract

There is a recurring (and contentious) debate over the extent to which the developers of consumer technologies that feature encryption should be required to ensure that law enforcement is able to access the contents of encrypted devices and communications pursuant to a warrant. On one side of this debate, law enforcement agencies point to the significant risks “warrant-proof encryption” may pose to the investigation of serious criminal activities. On the other side, civil liberties and technology policy groups argue that undermining consumer encryption threatens privacy, cybersecurity, and human rights – particularly amongst vulnerable people. However, this debate is being conducted largely in the absence of publicly-available data on how often various actors in the criminal justice system encounter encrypted devices, how they respond when an encrypted device is encountered, and the impact of these interactions on public safety and individual rights. Empirical research that answers these questions would substantially contribute to encryption governance.

Boustead's paper provides guidance to researchers who seek to collect data on encrypted devices, and policymakers considering whether and how to mandate reporting of data directly from agencies. Boustead begins by motivating this analysis with a discussion of the legal and policy issues that could be informed by additional data on encounters with encrypted devices in the criminal justice system, and a description of the (sparse) data currently available on this topic. She then explores potential issues that may arise when attempting to collect additional data, considering these issues from both research design and political feasibility perspectives. Finally, she develops options and best practices for the collection of these data in light of these issues.

Speaker

Annie Boustead is an Assistant Professor at the School of Government and Public Policy at the University of Arizon. She researches legal and policy issues related to electronic surveillance, privacy, policing, and drug policy. She is particularly interested in empirically studying law enforcement surveillance, and evaluating the impact of policies regulating this surveillance.

She has a Ph.D. from the Pardee RAND Graduate School, where her dissertation focused on the interplay between commercial data collection and law enforcement surveillance, and a J.D. from Fordham University School of Law.

Boustead was formerly a Postdoctoral Research Fellow with the Belfer Center's Cyber Project.