# Controlling "the Absolute Weapon": international authority and the IAEA

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# By late 1990s IAEA evolves into an international nuclear authority?



IAEA Chief Yukiya Amano visits Fukushima Daichi

ELBARADEI & IAEA WIN NOBEL PEACE PRIZE

AMANO

# The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)



- Created in 1957 after Eisenhower's 1953 Atoms For Peace speech to enhance security by reducing the incentives to pursue nuclear weapons

- Members debate issues in *Board of Governors (& Conference of States Parties)*

- Secretariat implements

  – Safeguards: measures to verify that civil nuclear facilities are not being misused to pursue weapons and associated materials are properly accounted for and are not diverted to undeclared uses (*nondiversion*)

  – Technical cooperation and other promotion projects (*promotion*)

- All members pay dues, not for individual projects

# The IAEA has multiple component institutions



- Secretariat
  - Technical Coop.
  - Safeguards
  - N. Energy
  - N. Sciences
  - N. Safety & Security
  - Management
- Director General
- Board of Governors
- Conference of States Parties

The IAEA has multiple component institutions

Agent

Agent

Principal

- Secretariat
  - Technical Coop.
  - Safeguards
  - N. Energy
  - N. Sciences
  - N. Safety & Security
  - Management
- Director General
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# IAEA Total Resources (2003 $US)

# How does the IAEA evolve into an international nuclear authority?

## Argument

1. Nonproliferation through delegation: the conditional transfer of autonomy and resources to an agent

   Principals benefit because the agent offers (a) greater commitment credibility, (b) technical policy partiality, and (c) political behavioral detachment

2. Nuclear authority: The power to issue rules and commands with which other actors expect they must comply

   Emerges from (a) continual demand for delegation as a solution to international nuclear issue cooperation and (b) its successful, but contingent, supply by the agent

# Evaluating IAEA authority, 1943-2012

Nonproliferation

Safety & Security

*Assess dynamics in multiple relationships*

- Among the IAEA's political and bureaucratic organs
- Between the IAEA and key states
- Of the role of key personalities
- From conflicts in the broader int'l environment

Peaceful Uses

Disarmament

Devices

# IAEA authority (1943-2012)?

| Period | Nonproliferation | Disarmament | Safety & Security | Peaceful Uses | PNEs & Weapons |
|--------|------------------|-------------|-------------------|---------------|----------------|
| 1940-56 | | | | | |
| 1957-65 | | | | | |
| 1965-75 | | | | | |
| 1976-85 | | | | | |
| 1986-95 | | | | | |
| 1996-01 | | | | | |
| 2002– | | | | | |

Authority Trend Key: ➜ = No change    ✖ = None    ( ) = Anticipated
↑ = strong increase    ↓ = strong decrease
↗ = moderate increase    ↘ = moderate decrease

# IAEA safeguards & NP: 1950s-60s

1. Atoms for Peace promises after failure of Baruch Plan, World Government, and Complete and General Disarmament

2. IAEA fails with EURATOM & bilateral safeguards

3. But…
   - INFCIRC/26 & INFCIRC/66
   - DG Cole replaced by DG Eklund
   - Board of Governors develop Spirit of Vienna
   - 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

# IAEA safeguards & NP: 1970s-80s

- NPT enters into force amidst debates over IAEA

- INFCIRC/153 "Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement"

  - Board negotiates Model on verifying accuracy of declarations, nondiversion from peaceful uses

  - Secretariat negotiates CSAs, Board approves (not subsidiary agreements)

  - Secretariat verification focuses on objective indicators of timely detection of the diversion from peaceful uses at strategic access points of significant quantities

# IAEA safeguards & NP: 1990s

- Iraq 1991
- But:
  - South Africa (1991-94)
  - Iraq (1991-1995)
  - Romania (1992)
  - North Korea (1992)
  - Kazakhstan (1993), Belarus (1993), Ukraine (1994)
- *But* DPRK 1993-

- Immediate safeguards reforms

- Programme 93+2

- INFCIRC/540

# IAEA safeguards & NP: Today?

- Iraq (2002-03) & Libya (2004) reinforce authority
  - Persistent demand for Agency policy partiality and behavioral detachment at Board and at UNSC
  - DG/Secretariat flexibility on reporting
  - Shifted: "accuracy" to "completeness" to "nonproliferation"
- But DPRK is a continuing dilemma (since 1994 AF), and handling of Iran (2003-) raise questions
  - Noncompliance and the UNSC?
  - Move from "completeness" to "weaponization"?
  - "Lost" CTBT, but FMCT? Warhead dismantlement?

# IAEA safeguards & NP authority!

| Period | Nonproliferation | Disarmament | Safety & Security | Peaceful Uses | PNEs & Weapons |
|--------|------------------|-------------|-------------------|---------------|----------------|
| 1940-56 | (↑) | | | | |
| 1957-65 | → | | | | |
| 1965-75 | ↑ | | | | |
| 1976-85 | → or ↘ | | | | |
| 1986-95 | ↗ | | | | |
| 1996-01 | → | | | | |
| 2002– | ↑ | | | | |

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# Implications of IO Authority

- Reforms of the IAEA to deal with new nuclear issues have implications for delegation and authority
  - Strengthen safeguards authority? (Mandatory A.P.?)
  - Revise safeguards approach? (Info-driven? "ITM"?)
  - Expand resources? (Safeguards, TC, or other?)
  - Empower alternative IOs? (CTBT*O*, FMCT*O*, ??)
- Advancing understanding of political institutions
  - How is the design of IOs related to their ability to affect political outcomes? How much is "contingent history"?
  - How is global governance changing?

# Thank you