

STATEMENTS OF WILLIAM H. TOBEY, SENIOR FELLOW, BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY; REBECCA L. HEINRICHS, FELLOW, GEORGE C. MARSHALL INSTITUTE; AND DAVID ALBRIGHT, FOUNDER AND PRESIDENT, INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. TOBEY

Mr. Tobey. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, and members of the committee. It is a pleasure to be here to speak about a matter of surpassing importance.

Preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon is vital to U.S. national security interest. The committee has asked to focus today on Iran's non-compliance with its safeguards obligations and from the opening statements, it is already clear that the committee has a profound understanding of those issues. So I will confine my remarks to just three points.

First, in 2005, the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors found that Iran had violated its safeguards obligations by failing in a number of instances over an extended period of time to make necessary declarations.

Second, since 2011, the International Atomic Energy Agency's Secretariat has expressed serious concerns about the possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear program which Tehran refuses to clarify despite being required to do so under the Joint

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Plan of Action agreement. And here I would note that many of the members referred to the so-called possible military dimensions and I think that gets to the heart of the important issues on the Iran agreement.

Third, in August 2014, less than six months ago, the United States Department of State sanctioned an Iranian government organization for ongoing nuclear weapons development work.

In sum, Iran has violated its safeguards obligations in the past. It is charged by the United States Government with doing so in the present. And evinces little reason to believe that it will not continue to do so in the future. Thank you.

[The statement of Mr. Tobey follows:]

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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Excellent panelists and I would like to ask unanimous consent that our subcommittee recognize our special guest who is with us, Mr. Trent Franks, for a statement he would like to make.

Mr. Franks. Thank you kindly, Madam Chair. I appreciate your holding this hearing so very much and as it happens Ms. Heinrichs was the military legislative assistant in our office and she taught us essentially everything we know about missile defense. And we are just extremely proud of the direction that she has gone, that she is able to teach other members of Congress and I think she is a force that is important to the world and I really appreciate you being able to hear her testimony today. I don't want to embarrass her. She didn't know I was doing this, but we are very impressed with all the great things she is doing. And with that, I am just grateful for the opportunity and I yield back.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Well, thank you so much and I think that that was an accurate assessment of her capabilities and she made a most excellent presentation. So trained by the best. I don't know which way that training went. I think knowing you, Trent, it went towards you. But thank you so much and I am so pleased with the testimony today and with the members present and this is an extremely important topic.

The administration's argument is that this deal will allow

us to have the mechanisms in place to monitor and verify Iran's compliance with any final agreement, to hold Iran accountable, and to prevent it from getting a bomb, a wonderful desire, wonderful outcomes. But as most folks pointed out, every indication from past history suggests otherwise, that Iran's continued stonewalling of the IAEA will continue and even during the implementation of the JPOA this stalling and this stonewalling was taking place. So it gives us further cause to be less than optimistic.

As the ranking member pointed out earlier this week, Olli Heinonen, the former Deputy Director General of the IAEA who we have had testify before us and Ray Takeyh, and former NSA and CIA Director General Michael Hayden, stated in an op ed in the Washington Post that even if the nuclear deal manages to push Iran's nuclear breakout time to one year, that is the stated goal, this might not be sufficient to detect and reverse the Iranian violations.

So I wanted to ask the panelists what are the difficulties in achieving a verification regime that would be capable of detecting, of testing, of acting to stop Iran from possible breakout for both the IAEA and their standards and the U.S. Intelligence Community? What difficulties do we have in getting such a structure in place?

We will begin with Mr. Tobey.

Mr. Tobey. Thank you, Madam Chair. The difficulties are considerable and they are made worse by what at least has been reported about the shape of the deal. You referenced creating a one year breakout time. That, of course, deals only with declared sites. So that would ensure or would aim to ensure that the declared sites were not used to make nuclear weapons. But the problem is that I think most analysts believe that were Iran to move in the direction of nuclear weapons, they would use undeclared sites, covert sites. And the burdens that are placed on any verification program for detecting covert sites are made much more difficult by the allowance of some enrichment work. I know that that has been bitterly disputed as to whether or not Iran should or should not be allowed to have any enrichment capability. But I think it is indisputable that if they have some capability it would be more difficult to verify that that capability isn't being diverted to covert sites.

So that is why it is so centrally important to get to the bottom of the so-called possible military dimensions that all of you have referenced, all of us have referenced. All of us in this room understand the importance of that issue. And I think it has to be gotten to the bottom of in order to ensure that future activity --

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Absolutely.

Mr. Tobey. It is not about the past. It is about the

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future.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Absolutely. Ms. Heinrichs?

Ms. Heinrichs. I agree with what my colleague just said. I will also just like to point out that because the nuclear program is so inextricably tied to their missile program, the missile component is something that hasn't been discussed as what it should be. But missile detection is much easier to do than to detect the weaponization elements of the nuclear program.

And so we can already see what they are doing with their missile program. So Mr. Tobey is correct. It is almost impossible to get to the bottom of the verification if they don't even disclose what they have done in the past. And we need to do that first. But I would suggest that an easier, possibly an easier way to actually see what they are doing is just look to see their massive missile program.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Very good point. Mr. Albright?

Mr. Albright. The administration's goal of having a one year breakout criteria makes sense. I mean you need something to drive in negotiations.

As Mr. Tobey pointed out and it is easier to apply to declared facilities and where the difficulty is, of course, is if Iran is going to try to do covertly. And I would say may do a hybrid or using declared and undeclared facilities. So there are many paths to the bomb.

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But I think the verification, if done rigorously, can actually lead to a situation where you could do this in a year. But it certainly would, from my point of view would need to include coming clean on PMD. You would have to be able to make sure Iran isn't smuggling goods in for a covert site, so you would need the U.N. Security Council sanctions to remain in place for the duration of the deal. If it has to empower or give more tools to the inspectors, they are going to have to be able to go, in a sense, very quick notice to sites where there are suspicions. They are going to have to have access. And so you are going to have to wire all this in an agreement. And if it isn't wired in an agreement, then I think it will be very hard to satisfy the one-year criteria for undeclared sites.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. True. Now as we know, Iran impedes any and all IAEA inspections that it can that may be related in any way to its suspect activities including the PMD. And we were talking about the snap inspections, the any time, anywhere inspections. Many people believe that we need that in order for this deal to be credible.

How likely is it that the Iran deal will include these inspection parameters that they will have this snap, any time, anywhere inspections? Will we insist on it? Will the IAEA insist on it? The Intelligence Community, will they be satisfied with what is in the deal to detect Iran's noncompliance if these

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snap inspections were not guaranteed in any final agreement?

Mr. Tobey. With respect to the any time, anywhere inspections, I don't know whether or not those will be a part of the agreement. But I would point out that there are other elements that may be as or more important. It is an important deterrent to have the ability for inspectors to go any place any time. But it is not how you generally detect a covert operation or a covert nuclear capability. That is done by talking to people, by examining records, by much broader declarations as Mr. Albright already referenced, by the sort of patient and careful work that would lead inspectors to understand that covert activity is underway. And it is only at the last moment that one would actually take the final step to go and visit a site.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. They have to do their homework before to be ablt to have that snap inspection.

Mr. Tobey. Absolutely. So all of that work is at least as important as the ability to go any time any where.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. I believe the only real way to prevent Iran's breakout is to dismantle its nuclear infrastructure. As long as we are only getting access to what Iran wants us to see, there is no way to know, as you pointed out, the real extent of Iran's nuclear program. And the current JPOA is limited to only declared sites, as you pointed out. It is the undeclared sites that should really worry us.

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Mr. Tobey, you stated that by doing this it actually facilitates Iran's ability to cheat. If you could explain that.

Mr. Tobey. I am sorry, by doing --

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The current JPOA is limited to only declared nuclear facilities and by doing this, we are actually perpetuating that

Mr. Tobey. Exactly. The focus of the talks has been creating this one year breakout time. So we have gone from a situation where the President's originally-stated goal was preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. In other words, changing their strategic calculus. Now our goal is putting a one year speed bump between Iran and a nuclear weapon.

Unfortunately, that applies only to declared sites. And the only way to get at undeclared sites is a two-fold operation which Mr. Albright has already referenced. One is to get to the bottom of these so-called possible military dimensions and the second is to be able to understand and monitor all of the equipment and materials that Iran is either importing or creating itself that would be applicable to making nuclear weapons. So without those two elements any agreement would not be verifiable.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And Mr. Albright, getting back to the snap inspections that you were talking about, how can the IAEA monitor and verify any Iranian activity at sites that are actually undeclared? If you could push that button.

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Mr. Albright. You asked would this be an agreement. I mean I think there is worry that it won't be. There is certainly indications that the administration is making compromises and the Iranians have been very tough on this. This was told to me by one of the negotiators well over a year ago that the Revolutionary Guard had sent a signal through the Iranian negotiators that there was no way the IAEA would be allowed to visit military or Revolutionary Guard sites. And so that was stated as one of the essentially two major redlines. And of course, that is unacceptable, but will the U.S. push hard enough to overcome this redline and get to an ability to have anywhere any time inspections.

Now of course, we will see, but I do worry about it and I think that without those I would expect they wouldn't get the broader declarations too, that there is a real risk that you won't have the package of measures needed to do adequate verification.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. It would be interesting to see. And one last question and I thank the members for allowing me all this time and you will have that time as well.

Ms. Heinrichs, you have done extensive work on Iran's ballistic missile program and as you pointed out in your testimony, written and verbal, several U.N. Security Council resolutions explicitly seek to curb Iran's missile program. But how closely related are Iran's progress on its ballistic missile

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program and its nuclear program? And do you think that the negotiations will include or should have included other aspects of Iran's dangerous activities including its support for terror, its ballistic missile program?

We had a full committee hearing last week and I think Mr. Blinken, we asked him is Iran the foremost state sponsor of terrorism and he said it is among the top. I can't even imagine except for North Korea who is in that league. But if you could tell us about the ballistic missile program and other aspects of Iran's dangerous behavior?

Ms. Heinrichs. Thank you for the question. I think it is possibly one of the most important questions. Iran's nuclear program is inextricably tied to its ballistic missile program. They go hand in glove. So if we simply pause their enrichment capability, for instance, they have already mastered the ability to enrich, and they are very patient, so they can go ahead and take a pause on that. And then continue the more difficult aspects of their program which is their delivery system, their ballistic missile system.

So ballistic missiles, they are relatively cheap, if you are going to try to pose an asymmetric threat to a country that is much more militarily sophisticated than Iran, like the United States. And that is exactly what the Iranians have been working on doing. They have just successfully orbited their fourth

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satellite which is that technology is directly transferrable to an ICBM capability and the Intelligence Community still assesses that Iran will be able to test an ICBM capability which would give them an ability to coerce the United States' homeland by this year.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Yi, yi, yi. Mr. Deutch is recognized.

Mr. Deutch. Thanks, Madam Chairman. Mr. Albright, during these negotiations we have been told that the goal ultimately is to cut off the four pathways to a nuclear bomb for Iran: Fordow, Natanz, Arak, and covert program. Are those the only four?

Mr. Albright. That covers it. I think there is always more, but that is the main pathways that the administration needs to worry about.

Mr. Deutch. And the access, the unprecedented access that we are told we received during this JPOA, during the interim deal, does not include any where, any time inspections?

Mr. Albright. No.

Mr. Deutch. What do we have now?

Mr. Albright. Well, there is better monitoring at declared sites and there is some more openness at parts of the centrifuge manufacturing complex. But in general, no. The measures that were put forth as part of the JPOA were never intended to be able to increase the IAEA's ability to detect covert sites.

Mr. Deutch. So what is it going forward? You said we need any where any time inspections and that those need to be in place

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for at least 20 years. Is that, given the reports in the news, would that be 10 years beyond the deal or would that be -- would that require a deal that is 20 years long?

Mr. Albright. It could be done independently of the limits on the nuclear program. I mean one would assume that when it is on the Arak reactor are indefinite. They won't be reversible, so once they are put in place there will just be limits on the ability to make weapon-grade plutonium.

On the centrifuge number, those could be lifted after some period of time. These inspection arrangements, these broader verification requirements must continue past that, I would argue. You are going to need them for a long time. In a sense, Iran has been in noncompliance for 20 years. I mean it has severe lack of credibility and ten years is just not enough.

Mr. Deutch. What does that mean, they have been in noncompliance? Take a step back. We are all steeped in this. We have been focused on this for a long time. For people who are tuning in to these talks because it is the very end and there is a lot of talk to understand about striking a deal with Iran and stopping it from acquiring nuclear weapons. Why are we concerned? What have they done wrong all this period? And weaponization and creation of a bomb, but they tell us they want to have a peaceful nuclear program. For people who haven't paid attention, explain to them why this matters so much.

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Mr. Albright. It is a little bit like someone who breaks the law. Iran has been deceiving the IAEA, the international community, for 20 years or so. And its intention was to put together in secret nuclear capabilities and part of that capability appears to have been oriented to getting nuclear weapons. So in a sense you have a situation where they have been caught and convicted. That is in the sense what the U.N. Security Council resolutions signify and that they are on probation. And we need time in order to verify that they are reformed. And in that period you need to limit their ability, in a sense their freedoms to move on nuclear programs.

Mr. Deutch. And they have not verified anything to date. A lot of believe we shouldn't, we can't make a deal, shouldn't consider making a deal if they are not willing to come clean on the past military dimensions of the program. Would it make sense for us to do that?

Mr. Albright. Obviously, the administration is thinking about not doing that. I think that is pretty clear. Or doing it in a much more limited way than maybe we have discussed today.

Now I think one of the problems of doing that is if I can go back to the days of the agreed framework, people were really scared of war with North Korea in '94. And a decision was made to call off the inspectors and a deal was made that essentially hobbled the inspectors. They were brought forth to do monitoring

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and I at the time supported the agreed framework, but I understood its weakness.

In this case, there is a risk that if you don't get the IAEA's strengthened, it doesn't go into this deal knowing what Iran has done in the past, you are hobbling them and undermining their ability to verify. But in this case, unlike the North Korean case, the IAEA is going to be called upon to be the lead investigator in a sense to determine whether Iran is complying.

Mr. Deutch. Right, so that is what I want to understand. So the IAEA -- Iran has completely stonewalled. They have not been forthcoming. They have not granted the access to the IAEA. They have not answered the questions posed by the IAEA which stem from the fact that we know that as you point out, we know what Iran was trying to do to develop nuclear weapons. They were caught. They were convicted, but we are now at the point where they are not complying with what the world has expected them to comply with, right?

Mr. Albright. That is right.

Mr. Deutch. So the question is going into a deal, if there is one, regardless of what the deal looks like, if it is the IAEA that is ultimately the entity that is going to monitor and verify whether the terms of a deal are being lived up to by the Iranians, how, number one, how can that happen? How do we trust that that can work given 20 years of experience that we have had with Iran's

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interaction with the IAEA?

Mr. Albright. I would agree that it can't work. I mean it is really -- I mean no one is looking for Iran to have a mea culpa. It would be nice and it would be very helpful, but there are ways to do this sort of thing. But Iran can't continue to -- it essentially almost abused the IAEA. They issue reports. One came out a couple of weeks ago which just belittles the IAEA. And also in that report, they argue strongly that the IAEA's verification as it exists today should be weakened. So you have a situation that is unacceptable and Iran does need to face up and make changes in how it views verification and how it treats the IAEA and how it satisfies the IAEA's condition.

And I would say that it may be that in the way the administration is negotiating this is that you can't force Iran to do this before the deal is signed, but you certainly can say no sanctions relief until they at least make concrete progress on addressing the IAEA's concerns.

Mr. Deutch. Right. So the question is if you -- if there is a deal that is reached, the moment that a deal is struck if there is sanctions relief of any kind and according to the reports in the press which is what we have to go by on the current negotiations, according to the reports in the press, Iran's sticking point is that they want massive sanctions relief or total sanctions relief at the outset. If you provide any sort of

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significant sanctions relief the day the agreement is signed, you will have rewarded Iran for 20 years of bad behavior, flouting international norms, and ignoring the demands of the IAEA. Isn't that right?

Mr. Albright. Yes, I agree.

Mr. Deutch. And finally, if the goal is a year's breakout time and we have just gone through all these concerns about the IAEA, is a year enough time? Is that goal enough for the IAEA to detect a potential breakout, to verify it, and then take action to stop it, particularly given that there are other countries Iran may argue the other countries, the P5+1, the U.N. may be brought in, is a year breakout time realistic if the IAEA is the entity that is tasked with enforcing it?

Mr. Albright. At declared sites, I think it is. And again, I think some of this depends on the U.S. being willing to take military action if it believes there has been a violation and it is confirmed. And the idea with the year is that there would be enough time to gather international support to avoid that. But in the end, some of this is going to rest on the U.S. being willing to do that.

Now in the covert sites, if the verification is not improved from what would be traditional IAEA safeguards and additional protocol, then it is going to be tough. I mean you could easily have had a situation with Iran where you do spend a year arguing

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in the United States, internationally, on what has happened, is it really a violation? You may have trouble pulling together a coalition and the U.S. may be put in a position of having to decide does it take military action when there is deep opposition to that military action? But if the verification arrangements are done properly, then I think a year can be enough. But it is going to require a very intrusive verification system and it is unclear if that can be accomplished.

Mr. Deutch. Madam Chairman, I appreciate the indulgence. Anything short of that then, anything short of unprecedented anywhere any time inspections demanded by the world of Iran which Iran should comply with given their history and given what else would be included in this deal, anything short of that makes that one year breakout time which has been the goal we have been told of these entire negotiations significantly perhaps dramatically less than one year leaving us with a dramatically reduced period of time in which to respond.

Mr. Albright. Could be, but the one thing I would say anywhere any time is not unprecedented. That language is adopted from what South Africa said it would do after it decided to come clean about its past nuclear weapons program which also was a big fight. South Africa refused to do that initially despite the evidence, but under pressure decided to come clean and accepted this idea of anywhere any time inspection. So I think it is not

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unprecedented. But I do think that there is a lot of parts to verification. And so I wouldn't want to say that if you don't get one exactly as you need it, that the thing falls apart. You have to look at it system wide. But without any time any where inspections, the job gets much harder.

Mr. Deutch. I appreciate that, Madam Chairman, thank you and I thank the other witnesses for your testimony. I didn't want to exclude you, but I am out of time. Thank you.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch. Mr. DeSantis of Florida.

Mr. DeSantis. Mr. Tobey, are you comfortable with the enrichment ability that is contemplated under this deal? It had always been that they were not going to be able to enrich. Now they have substantial number of centrifuges. Are you comfortable with that?

Mr. Tobey. The original idea to ban all enrichment was to keep Iran from gaining the technical capacity to understand that, so they couldn't mount a covert effort. Unfortunately, that horse is out of the barn. So the original rationale for that, I think, is diminished. At the same time, zero is a lot easier to verify than some higher number which would allow the technology and equipment perhaps to be diverted.

So while I think it is not an ideal situation, the only terms under which I would be comfortable is if we had two additional

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verification provisions. One would be to get to the bottom of the possible military dimensions as we have talked about and the second would be to have firm control over the materials and equipment that Iran either produces or imports as Mr. Albright has described. So this would be an ongoing monitoring situation.

And so by allowing some level of enrichment, I think it demands a much more rigorous verification system.

Mr. DeSantis. The ten-year sunset that is reported, is that adequate?

Mr. Tobey. It doesn't strike me as adequate. This issue was reported by the IAEA Board of Governors to the U.N. Security Council ten years ago. I am dumbfounded that we might have an agreement that would be shorter than the time it has taken to negotiate it.

Mr. DeSantis. Ms. Heinrichs, do you agree with that? Ten years to just simply walk away after ten years and trust that they are going to behave. Does that bother you?

Ms. Heinrichs. No, I don't think that we should trust them now. I think ten years is not adequate because what we really want is for them to make the political decision to move away from a nuclear weapons capability and they have not done that.

Mr. DeSantis. In terms of the military sites, because it seems to me that if you are not having any type of inspection of those sites, if there are secret sites and we have no reason to

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take Iran at its word seems to me that they could abide by the deal in the sense of allowing full inspections and yet they could still end up developing a nuclear weapon, correct?

Mr. Tobey. One thing that I would point out is that Secretary Kerry, I think reasonably, said it is unacceptable for Iran to be two months away, to have a two-month breakout. If it is unacceptable today, I don't understand why it becomes any more acceptable 10 or 15 years from now and at least what has been reported was that the broad restrictions in the Iranian program would fall away after 10 or 15 years which would enable them to move right back to that 2 month breakout period.

Mr. DeSantis. Even if the inspections were allowed to go to these sites, if the military sites are not included, then they could conceivably keep the deal with respect to those inspections, but still develop a capacity. Is that inaccurate?

Mr. Albright. It is a fear. I mean if the IAEA can't do its job and get to the bottom of what has happened, the PMD issues, namely, and then be able to continue verifying no activity at those sites and among those people and potentially other sites, then it would be an agreement where Iran could just wait it out.

But the idea is that you try to at least have restrictions on the program for a generation. That was the goal. Looking back a year, the goal was to have restrictions, pretty strict restrictions on the whole program for a year, intrusive

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verification, and then over that period of time you would then develop confidence that they wouldn't try to get weapons in the future.

Mr. DeSantis. Or give time to have a change in the regime or change in the nature of the regime.

Mr. Albright. That is right. And so if you shorten that, and it is just ten years, then of course, you have to worry more. Now I would say be careful. We don't know the details. The administration is going out of its way to confuse us, I will admit, when they talk about using double digits or they use terms like at least ten years. They talk about phasing on the enrichment programs. So I think the situation is very confused. But I do think it is very logical to demand that the verification conditions either be permanent or last at least a generation. And I think that has be a very clear message that the administration hears.

Mr. DeSantis. Look, I am mindful about kind of jumping on some of these reports. At the same time, you do look at the behavior of the Gulf States and what they see. Their behavior is not very comforting in terms of this being a deal that they have confidence in and obviously they fear an Iranian bomb very much.

Look, my bottom line is we have seen different examples of this where North Korea, obviously, didn't work. I think Gaddafi,

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he feared he was going to be removed from power. He really was worried about the threat of military force. And I just wonder whether Iran really believes that that credible threat is on the table. And if they don't, then man, I think that they have every incentive to want to cheat this deal. I am over my time and I will yield back. I am good. Thank you.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. DeSantis. And thank you, Mr. Boyle, from Pennsylvania. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Boyle. As you might remember from my brief opening remarks, consistent with what I think pretty much everyone who has spoken on both sides of the aisle here, I come to this whole issue as someone who is highly skeptical that we could reach an agreement that reasonable people would have full confidence in.

That said, it is worth remembering, I think it was Ms. Heinrichs who quoted President Reagan, "Trust, but verify." He quoted the Russian proverb, "Doverai no proveryai." The reason why we remember that is because it was said at a signing ceremony with Mikhail Gorbachev. And so those agreements that after the failure at Reykjavik, when the agreements were signed in '87 and '88, they were criticized at the time by some as naive and going too far. And I would say that history proved them -- proved President Reagan pretty well in terms of reaching those agreements.

So toward that end, while I am highly skeptical given Iran's

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repeated history of bad faith behavior with the IAEA and with the international community and being with one of the largest, if not the largest, exporters of terror in the world, all of that having been said, if by some grace of God a new leadership were to come in Tehran, actual, real, Western-oriented, moderate, who wanted Iran to rejoin the international world, and give up this path that they have been on over the last three and a half decades, what would a real agreement look like that each of you would say that is something that is worth signing? That is something that we could place trust in and actually have real confidence that it was actually an agreement worth signing?

Mr. Tobey. In terms of a technical model, it has already been referenced, the South Africa example is probably a good one. I would also look for markers of a strategic decision just as you described, that Iran had decided to forego pursuing nuclear weapons in favor of a better relationship with other nations.

Frankly, I do come back again to this possible military dimensions issue. If they are not willing to come clean on that, it not only makes verification more difficult, but it is a marker of Iranian intent because they clearly want to hide something in order to preserve it.

And so I would say that an agreement that looked like it was going to be useful and that is what I think all of us here seek. I mean the reason we have criticisms about what may be taking place

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is because we want a better deal, not because we don't want a deal. It would be to get to the bottom of that issue.

Ms. Heinrichs. I appreciate the question. I would agree that we have to get to the bottom of the possible military dimensions, but again, I think it is a bit of a litmus test to look at their missile program. There is no reason that the Iranians need to be as dedicated to their massive ballistic missile arsenal that they have if they don't intend to use it for coercion. And who are they trying to coerce? It is the United States. It is the United States' influence in the region. And so I think unless we see a political decision or a strategic decision of the Iranians to move away from this ballistic missile capability, which I believe is inextricably tied to their nuclear program, and then allow complete unfettered access of the IAEA to its nuclear program to show that they are actually coming clean, essentially, the South Africa example being a good one, then we should not trust them enough to secure a diplomatic solution to this problem.

Mr. Albright. I think one of the worries that was alluded to earlier that they will just wait it out. They did some of that during the time of the suspension from '03 to '06 and President Rouhani bragged about how they were able to advance while waiting it out. So I think one of the concerns now is that the pattern of the Iranians appears to be to basically say that yes, we will

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give up the IR1s which are pretty decrepit machines, but we want to be able to advance our centrifuges and build advanced ones and keep that program alive.

And I think that this deal is going to be much less worthwhile if Iran succeeds in being able to do centrifuge R&D on a substantial basis and I think there is a real worry that that could happen. And clearly, it is where I think the Iranians are building their narrative. And the U.S. has invested a lot into capping and reducing the IR1 program which may be the thing that Rouhani cares least about at this point in time. Certainly, the nuclear people probably don't care about.

Some other things that are very important is and I think the administration has made progress is in getting rid of the stocks of well-enriched uranium in Iran. They can't stay there. Whether they are in hexafluoride form or oxide, they should leave the country. So I think they have made good progress on getting that established, but whether Iran will go along or not is still an open question, but if there are very minimal stocks in Iran, then that would be -- that would build confidence in this deal.

Another thing is that Fordow would be shut down and not involved in any enrichment, that Iran should not have deeply buried sites that contain any gas centrifusion enrichment capability. That is critical, too. Again, I am not sure the administration is going to get that or is even seeking that at

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this point in time.

So I think that there are many ways you could put together an agreement and I think the administration has thought through all of them and so now the question will be are they going to come up with an agreement with enough of those in there that one can have confidence in.

Mr. Boyle. Well, I thank you, all three of you and I see I have hit my time limit. But I would just ask in closing and maybe a quick response, South Africa has been referenced a number of times. I think though not on the nuclear part, but in terms of a country that was clearly engaging in terrorism and then actually decided they wanted to rejoin the international world and that was more important to them under the end of Muammar Gaddafi. That is actually an example of a country that remarkably changed its behavior.

I was wondering if we know of any others that we can point to as a potential model to hope and work towards Iran joining?

Mr. Boyle. There has been other victories, less well known, but Taiwan had a nuclear weapons program and the U.S. intervened politically to end it. And it was done very quietly. So I think there are other victories. Same in South Korea. It was a little tougher there, but -- so I think there is ways to do this, but again, I think it depends on the U.S. exerting its influence and the country changing its attitude toward some of these issues.

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Mr. Tobey raised this issue of --

Mr. Boyle. And every one of the examples cited it was ultimately initiated by a decision made in that capital to completely change and which direction it was going and change its priorities and then behavior changes followed that.

Mr. Albright. But under a lot of pressure. Those cases involved tremendous amounts of pressure, even South Africa. There were cases, I was told, meetings with nuclear officials in South Africa with U.S. officials where a South African official was fist pounding essentially on the table denying they had a nuclear weapons program just a week or two before de Klerk admitted, yes, we did have one. So I think that pressure matters. And in South Africa, congressional pressure mattered. If you look back in history, you will see that the U.S. Congress played a very important role.

Ms. Heinrichs. I would just add that it was under enormous political pressure, but it was also in the case of Libya and then as the Intelligence Community has said that they believe that some of the weaponization activities did cease around the 2003 time line, about the time that Libya then voluntarily gave up their WMD program, but it was under the fear of a credible threat of military invasion. It was when the United States went into Iraq. So I think that that is important to keep in mind that without the credible threat of force, that some of these things might not

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have happened.

Mr. Boyle. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much and unfortunately that credible show of force is lacking in Iran. The negotiations look to be we are playing a very weak hand and I don't think that pressure is being applied to Iran and Congress has been muted and the sanctions are being lifted and we are in pretty bad shape. But you were wonderful panelists so we thank you very much for being here with us. And with that, the subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 3:48 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]