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Student Research



Ten Years after September 11: An Analysis of Public Opinion in the Muslim World

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In January 2011, protests started in Tunisia and Egypt, sparking a string of uprisings in the Muslim world, with consequences yet unknown. These monumental shifts caught many politicians, academics, journalists and pollsters by surprise. As world leaders scramble to formulate policy to confront these new realities, there is an urgent need for accurate and relevant public opinion data on the Muslim world.

In the ten years since the eleventh of September, issues regarding the Muslim world have taken a prominent position in the media, academia, policy circles and living rooms across the US. In spite of this, the region and its issues remain enigmatic and complicated to many in the US. Often, information alone does not get at the core of what is going on in the region, unless it is understood in the proper context. Lacking this deep understanding, it is difficult to craft policy that is appropriate, relevant and grounded in the realities of these countries.

Our client is a global public opinion survey organization. Through its survey data, reporting and analysis, it has the ability to both capture world public opinion and influence global perceptions. Our work is specifically timed to inform one particular survey, as well as its long-term work. Although our client is interested in new information on the Muslim world, its primary region of interest for this report was the Muslim Middle East. This priority is reflected in the report.

This report provides recommendations on how our client can increase the accuracy and relevancy of its survey work through question formulation and reporting and analysis. It focuses on our client's key regional issues of democratization, Islamism and terrorism and on countries of Egypt, Lebanon and Pakistan. It also recommends an expanded framework of analysis for interpretation of results.

Our research questions are:

- How can our client improve its question formulation and analysis of its polls of the Muslim world, and how can we help it achieve this goal?
- What are the most significant issues faced by the Muslim world, and how can polling organizations expand their thinking and analysis on these issues?
- What are the relevant themes and cleavages in the Muslim world?
- Where are the gaps in existing public opinion data? What and where is well-covered?

This report seeks to help improve the accuracy and relevance of our client’s survey work in the Muslim world, particularly in the Middle East. To do so, we:

- Reviewed existing public opinion data and created a polling information database;
- Assessed how the client approaches core regional issues of democratization, Islamism and terrorism;
- Analyzed democratization, Islamism and terrorism in the Muslim world;
- Surveyed key experts in Egypt, Lebanon and Pakistan; and
- Conducted country case study assessments of Egypt, Lebanon and Pakistan.

Our goal is to help maximize the accuracy and relevance of our client’s work, including question formulation and interpretation of results. Our choice of issues and countries was informed by the client’s pressing needs and gaps in understanding, as well as by the degree of current significance and urgency, as defined by the literature, quantitative data and key experts.

This report has been edited to respect the privacy of the client. The full report includes recommendations on two levels: procedural recommendations to the approach on question formulation, reporting and analysis of results, and substantive recommendations on specific content for survey work. These recommendations are intended to help our client:

- Position its work to address gaps and weaknesses in US-Muslim world understanding;
- Ensure that questions are tailored to the relevant nuances of each issue;
- Address key regional and country cleavages in formulating and analyzing surveys; and
- Anticipate regional and country factors that can bias interpretation of survey results.

II. METHODOLOGY

Our goal is to maximize the accuracy and relevancy of the client's survey work, specifically its question formulation, and reporting and analysis of results.

To achieve this goal, we utilized a variety of methods, including:

- Synthesizing existing public opinion data;
- Reviewing literature on democratization, Islamism and terrorism;
- Conducting in-person interviews of key actors in Egypt, Lebanon and Pakistan;
- Collecting quantitative indicators about the Muslim world, in particular Egypt, Lebanon and Pakistan;
- Collecting qualitative information about the Muslim world, in particular Egypt, Lebanon and Pakistan; and
- Collecting key drivers and cleavages in the Muslim world, Egypt, Lebanon and Pakistan.

To make this information practically useful for the client, our outputs include:

- The first known comprehensive database of existing public opinion data of the Muslim world;
- Issue assessments of democratization, Islamism and terrorism in the Muslim world;
- Summaries of interview themes with data on the Muslim world, Egypt, Lebanon and Pakistan;
- Assessments of key cleavages in the Muslim world, Egypt, Lebanon and Pakistan,
- An analysis of existing approaches to survey questions on democratization, Islamism and terrorism; and
- Integrated policy recommendations.

Definition of the Muslim world

There is no one widely accepted definition of the Muslim world. Many organizations define this region in different ways. For the purposes of this report, the Muslim world is defined as Muslim majority countries, or where a country's Muslim citizens exceed 50 percent, as measured in February 2011.

Although the term "Muslim world" is widely used to discuss a group of countries as a region, it is important to keep in mind the extreme variance found within this area. Some Muslim majority countries have more similarities with non-Muslim countries in their geographic region than with the rest of the Muslim world as a whole.

Polling database

The goal of our synthesis of existing public opinion data is to create a comprehensive central database of current polling data that can be used now and in the future. At the moment our client does not have such a database, and to the best of our knowledge this is the first database of its kind. The survey database tracks the themes, questions, countries, survey years, survey organizations, and primary data for publically available public opinion surveys in the last 10 years.

We collected data for surveys based on the following criteria: that surveys were 1) conducted within the last 10 years; 2) related to issues of the Muslim world; 3) implemented in the Muslim world; 4) publicly available and 5) available in or translated to English. This database does not include our client’s survey information, as we are using the database as a benchmark to assess their strategy.

We gathered data from around 150 surveys using databases like World Public Opinion, the Institute for Quantitative Social Science, Polling the Nation and Roper Express, supplemented by extensive research. The complete list of organizations is included in the database.

The surveys were selected using the following filters:

- Significance - the source is significant in size, reputation and coverage and/or the source provides a unique regional perspective on the Muslim world;
- Relevancy - the source produces public opinion data that is no more than 10 years old;
- Scope - the survey is broad and relevant to the Muslim world, Islam or US policy or relations. Surveys based solely on one topic like torture, international law or government taxation were not included;
- Primary Data - the survey is fully or sufficiently described, either in primary data on the questions and on the results, or in a comprehensive report – surveys cited in press releases or in news reports, but for which we could not access sufficient data, were not included

After selecting the surveys, we assessed their content. For each, we examined what topics were covered, how each question was worded, location of the survey, years of the survey and primary data of survey results. We assigned “tags” to each survey, based on issue groupings of similar topics. We counted the surveys for each tag, as well as the number of surveys implemented in each country in the Muslim world.

While the data provided reveals much about polling organization and Muslim majority countries, this was not a comprehensive assessment. Our research attempted to produce a representative collection of public opinion survey data that is available online and in print. We recognize that there are a number of important surveys that we did not consider, or were unable to locate. Although the polls were conducted in the language of the survey participants, we did not consider polling results that were not available in English or were not translated into English. This is a shortcoming, particularly when our region of interest is not English speaking. Finally, we did not include narrower surveys that were primarily focused on only one issue. It should also be noted that we only collected data for surveys implemented in Muslim majority countries. We did not assess surveys of the US or Europe that deal with perceptions of the Muslim world.

Literature Review

This report reviews the literature on democratization, Islamism, and terrorism in the Muslim world. These topics were chosen based on the following criteria: (1) the client's interest, needs and gaps in understanding; (2) importance of issues to the organization's past, present and future survey work and its ability to inform and shape perceptions; (3) timeliness and urgency of understanding topics relating to the Muslim world; and (4) coverage of existing public opinion data. We assessed academic literature, including books and peer-reviewed academic journals.

Country Case Studies

The case study countries were chosen based on: (1) the location of our client's 2011 survey work; (2) the contribution to current information on the greater Middle East; (3) the need for a diverse array of political, social and economic conditions in countries; and (4) the inclusion of countries that exemplify particularly compelling implications for the key issues of democratization, Islamism, and terrorism.

Quantitative Data

The regional and country case studies were supplemented by quantitative indicators, largely from the University of Gothenburg's Quality of Governance Dataset. We used the dataset version May 27, 2010. We primarily used the time-series data, and cut the dataset at year 2007 or 2008, as the indicators were available for the countries of interest.

Qualitative Interviews

We conducted interviews with local experts and political elites in Egypt, Lebanon and Pakistan. The interviewees included political officials, academics, journalists, researchers and others from civil society. We also conducted informal street-interviews. The questions were informed by the synthesis of existing public opinion data and literature review, as well as regional urgency and our client’s traditional survey questions, current interests and gaps in understanding. Questions are generally structured around the key issues of democratization, Islamism and terrorism.

Skewing of Data

Due to the countries selected for case studies, parts of this report are skewed toward the Middle Eastern Muslim world. While we recognize the challenge this poses in terms of generalization to the whole region, this focus was intentional, as the Middle East is the component of the Muslim world that the client is most interested in for the purposes of this report.

III. EXISTING PUBLIC OPINION DATA


Since the events of September 11, hundreds of public opinion surveys have been conducted in the Muslim world, creating a wealth of knowledge about themes, trends and puzzles in public opinion. Despite the importance of these surveys, no comprehensive database exists where these polls can be analyzed in one place.

To solve this problem, and in response to the needs of our client, we created a database of publicly-available public opinion surveys that have been conducted in Muslim-majority countries during the last 10 years. The tool, available in Microsoft Excel, allows our client to track themes, countries covered and base survey data. The database can be used to highlight gaps in the existing public opinion data and in assessing issues and countries that are not well covered. Because it also tracks surveys by year, it can be used to follow trends in survey coverage over time. This tool will allow our client to precisely position itself vis-à-vis the field of polling organizations and to visualize the contribution of each of its surveys.

While the database is representative of a certain set of public opinion data, it is by no means completely comprehensive. We only pulled surveys that were available in or translated into English, publicly available, implemented in the Muslim world, multi-issue, and for which the base survey data or a comprehensive report was available. We avoided surveys from media organizations, unless they otherwise fit the criteria above.

Countries Covered

Our database tool finds that surveys in the Muslim world are implemented in clusters (see Figure 1 and Table A13). A handful of countries – such as Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan, Turkey and Nigeria – were extremely popular. The rest of the Muslim countries were extremely under-represented. In the Middle East, Kuwait, Syria, Libya, Qatar, Yemen and Oman were not surveyed. A number of Middle Eastern countries, including Morocco, were in the middle tier of representation, as were Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Malaysia and Bangladesh.

Figure 1. Aggregate surveys of the Muslim world, by country surveyed.

Source: Counting analysis of existing publicly available survey data, December 20, 2010.

Graphically, the database shows that existing public opinion data is highly concentrated in selected Middle Eastern countries, a small part of North Africa and much of Muslim Southeast Asia. Much of Central Asia, North Africa, and parts of the Arabian Peninsula are underrepresented.


Issues Covered

In the 10 years since September 11, the top four issues addressed by our database surveys revolve around domestic issues: satisfaction with the current regime, support for national policies, domestic democratization and general support for democracy, and domestic economic issues and concerns (see Table A14). Other popular issues focus on international affairs, including relations with the United States and support for American foreign policy and other foreign leaders. Questions also often focused on personal interactions with domestic economy, media, education, and health services.

While democratization, Islamism and terrorism are popular topics in the aggregate, each shows different trends of inclusion in surveys over the past 10 years (see Figure 2). Democratization has increased, but only somewhat. Most of this increase occurred from 2003 – 2005, and again in 2007 – 2008. Islamism has increased, but less so. Atten-

tion to this topic in surveys mostly increased in 2006 – 2007. In recent years, Islamism has stayed steady in terms of survey popularity. Terrorism, including questions about domestic terror, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, spiked sharply post-2001, and has consistently increased since then.

Figure 2. Annual surveys in the Muslim world, by issue.



Source: Counting analysis of issues in existing publicly available surveys in the Muslim world, December 20, 2010.

While this report does not directly analyze the content of existing survey questions on a particular issue, it can provide some general observations. Firstly, surveys tend to focus on values – for example, asking about democratic values like participation and accountability. Secondly, some issues were popular in terms of aggregate numbers, but were in fact largely focused on one component of a wider issue. For example, questions about gender focused mostly on the formal rights of women as opposed to the functional role of women in society. Questions about Islamism tended to cover general inquiries about personal religiosity rather than specific questions on the role of Islam in politics. Thirdly, issues like free media and its consumption, human rights and ethnic issues seemed under-covered. Fourthly, most questions did not focus on support for specific policy choices or policy options; instead, they were focused at a higher values level and/or at a lower personal interactions level.

IV. DEMOCRATIZATION, ISLAMISM AND TERRORISM

While surveys of the Muslim world tend to focus on a similar set of issues, these issues are very nuanced and complicated. Survey organizations take different approaches to public opinion polling – approaches that have significant implications for question formulation and reporting and analysis of results.

Democratization, Islamism and terrorism are urgent and relevant issues in the Muslim world today, and will be instrumental in defining its future. Our client has recognized the importance of these issues in its past public opinion polls. Through a review of the literature, this section aims to create a nuanced framework that can be used to shape our client's survey work on these issues.

The 2011 revolutions and changes across the Middle East caught many by surprise. Policymakers, facing new realities, are looking to public opinion data and available scholarship to create strategies to reassess the prospects for democracy, the impacts and implications of Islam and Islamist movements, and the role and perception of violent extremism. They are facing important questions: Can Hezbollah peacefully take part in the democratic process? Will Egypt become a functioning democratic state, and what is its path to getting there? What states will be seen as the new models of Muslim democracies? Should the U.S. fear Islamist political parties like the Muslim Brotherhood?

This assessment attempts to answer some of these questions by revealing what is happening across the region on the topics of democratization, Islamism and terrorism – and connecting this information to the client's framework for survey work.

Democratization

Much of the Muslim world is autocratic. However, there is significant variance across the region in levels of democratization, and many Muslim countries have strong, developing democracies. The Middle East has been the toughest nut to crack – it largely resisted the 1980s global trend for governments to transition to democracies. A number of theories have suggested explanations: political exclusion and the nature of Islam; the control of a strong state and security apparatus; a lack of civil society; and the presence of oil and other natural resources. Since then, while the Muslim world has not completely opened up, most countries have democratized to some extent – even though some of these changes have been purely formal, others have been at least somewhat functional.

The 2011 protests in Tunisia, Bahrain, Egypt, Syria and Libya were driven by a potent mix of political repressions and economic failures. Democracy is seen as key both

instrumentally – as a system of government that is more effective at delivering jobs and economic benefits, and intrinsically – as a process that conveys essential human dignity and freedoms. While it remains to be seen how much, and what type of, democracy will be implemented due to the revolutions; the issue has been raised loud and clear. It will have reverberations across the region that should be tracked and understood.

Islam and Democracy

On average, the Muslim world has lagged in terms of democratization. Some scholars, such as Samuel Huntington in his famous work, “The Clash of Civilizations”, suggest that there is something fundamental about Islamic religion and culture that is inimical to democracy.¹ This “Muslim exceptionalism” when it comes to democracy, however, is more an issue of correlation rather than causation. While more democracies are found in non-Muslim countries, there are empirical exceptions to this theory including Malaysia, Mali, Indonesia and Turkey. These countries are outside of the Arab Middle East, suggesting that perhaps there is an “Arab” variable that is stronger than an Islamic one². This assumption, however, is being challenged by current events in the Middle East.

Others claim that Islam itself is not necessarily un-democratic. There are a number of democratic values, principles, and processes within the tenets and teachings of Islam itself.³ Alternative theories have suggested that it may not be Islam, but religiosity in general, that tends to strongly influence democratization.⁴ This theory finds that after controlling for religiosity (the importance of religion and religious activities on a personal level), Islam loses its predictive influence on democracy levels.

A few elements are particularly important here – first, the sources of authority and texts that people in the Muslim world refer to for guidance and information. Because there are tenets in Islam that can be seen as pro-democratic and anti-democratic, the power of interpretation and selection is quite significant. Second, Islam is far from the only force shaping public opinions on democracy. Numerous other factors feed perceptions on democracy, from national stability and regional examples to economic concerns.

Popular Support for Democracy

Although most countries in the Muslim World are not democratic, this does not mean that there is a lack of support for the idea of democracy.⁵ Democracy is relatively popular in Muslim-majority countries, and is often preferred over other forms of government. This is true even in the Arab Muslim world, and in countries that are highly religious.⁶ So, religious attitudes and values, and Islamic religious orientation, are not in and of themselves a barrier to popular democratic support.⁷

In spite of democracy's appeal as an idea, many in the Muslim world are unsure of what a democratic political system would look like in their country, what the next steps would be and whether democratization is even a realistic option. This concern ties into the durability of regimes in much of the Muslim world, particularly the Arab Middle East.

Attitudes that are correlated with support for democracy, broadly called emancipative values, include things like prioritizing equality over patriarchy, tolerance over conformity, autonomy over authority and expression over security.⁸ Other proxies for support of democratization include: popular support for individualism⁹; tolerance of others, particularly marginalized groups¹⁰; acceptance of divorce¹¹; acceptance of homosexuality; tolerance of racial and ethnic diversity; popular support for foreign intervention¹² and popular support for privatization.¹³ These values appear to have a more direct and significant impact on public support for democratization than do religious orientation or religiosity. However, emancipative values tend to be lower in the Muslim world. Because they are so important, it would be very valuable to track these over time, particularly as socioeconomic conditions change.

Elections

Elections are held in most countries in the Muslim world. They vary widely in form and in their independence. Most of these elections are characterized by extremely strong state control.¹⁴ Elections are generally seen as a way to channel and control opposition and discontent.¹⁵ They allow a state to produce formally democratic reforms while still retaining the power to dictate electoral results. Holding elections also potentially allows the regime to check in on the mood of the people and for the people to express discontent through the venues of campaign speeches and voting instead of through protests or gathering consensus around democratization.¹⁶ Because the state controls election results, it is not threatened.

Just as elections serve a variety of purposes for the state, elections are perceived in different ways across the Muslim world. These perceptions can be strong and contain particular national narratives. In Egypt just before the protests, many people, from shopkeepers to political and academic officials, were frustrated with how openly the 2010 elections were rigged. Although elections are often the low-hanging fruit of a country demonstrating its democratic efforts to international actors, they can signal interesting opinions about regime support, sectarianism and internal conflict, and legislative and regulatory changes.

Civil Society and Opposition

A strong civil society generally plays a normatively “good” role in institutional reform and democratization.¹⁷ That is, when civil society is strong, it is able to strengthen institutions and check state power. In leading democratizers like Indonesia, Mali and Senegal, Islamic organizations and secular civil society have played instrumental roles in their democratization. Because power and wealth tend to be highly concentrated in the Muslim world, civil society can be another tool for centralized regime control. In Morocco, civil society is relatively strong, vibrant and widespread – and yet it tends to be created, governed or allied with the political elite or the regime.¹⁸

Often, Islamic organizations and charities step into the civil society void and become the key nexus for community life. These networks are not necessarily Islamist, but some of them are manipulated to support racial Islam and extremism.

Opposition parties play a similar role – having a strong opposition movement helps check the state, but strong opposition movements are rare in the Muslim world. Islamist parties are often the only source of organized opposition to the state because of their unique access to financial support and networks. They are also the elements that governments frequently suppress.

Government institutions are generally frail in the Muslim world. In countries with high level of sectarianism, it is even more difficult for institutions to represent plural groups and to deliver services to all communities.

A Strong State

States, particularly in the Muslim world, tend to be extremely strong – but not always effective.¹⁹ This is an interesting paradox that has been pointed to as a shortcoming that could help support democratization.²⁰ Conversely, some Muslim states are very effective, at least selectively and at the local level. Often, candidates will campaign based on specific projects they can deliver to local communities. This “local results-oriented” campaigning, as opposed to focusing on broader national issues, does create some accountability for state officials and for political party members.

However, regardless of the effectiveness of the state, most Muslim states are extremely powerful. They tend to hold economic resources from oil revenues and foreign aid. They also tend to have extremely large coercive apparatuses like security forces and the military.²¹ This is a very important part of the political and social dynamic in many Muslim countries – the force of the state is an always-present reality.

Oil Revenue and Renterism

One unique factor of many Islamic societies is the economic dominance of oil and more generally of externally generated rents like foreign aid.²² These revenues flow directly to the state and concentrate power and control over resources in the hands of the state and of the elite. The regime is financially independent and lacks ties to a labor class or domestic manufacturing sector. Reliance on oil revenues means that the regime does not have to tax its citizens. Lacking this leverage, it is more difficult for citizens to demand services, transparent practices or a government free of corruption.²³ International reliance on this oil leads to soft budgeting funded by international power holders both during times of crisis and in the long-term. And a richer state has more resources to invest in a large security apparatus, as tends to happen in the Muslim world.²⁴

Oil is often posited as one of the most powerful anti-democratic factors common across much of the Muslim world.²⁵ Indeed, some studies have shown that after controlling for oil exports, Islam itself has little negative effect on democracy and democratization.²⁶

One of the Muslim world's leading democracies, Indonesia, has benefited greatly from a reduced dependence on oil. The portion of Indonesia's export revenues derived from oil dropped from 44 percent in 1990 to 18 percent in 2004.²⁷ And Indonesia's democratization was delayed until the late 1990s, a timeline that was roughly correlated with its fuel diversification.

Women

Women's rights are severely hampered in many Muslim-majority societies. Sex inequality is significantly and negatively associated with democracy. Improvements in sex equality have been shown to directly result in more democratization. Some believe that gender issues are at the core of what is preventing democratization in much of the Muslim world.²⁸ Others have suggested that there is a large gap in attitudes on gender issues not between the Muslim world and the non-Muslim world, but between Arab Muslim societies and non-Arab societies.²⁹ Income and educational level are also important variables to consider.

For example, models estimate that removing the sex literacy gap in Pakistan would reduce the chance of democratization failing to 39 percent from 51 percent, even with an otherwise identical society.³⁰ While some aspects of gender issues are long-term and structural, some indicators are changing. From 1990 to 2004, the gender literacy gap dropped from 18 percent to 4 percent in Tunisia, from 13 percent to 4 percent in Saudi Arabia and from 6 percent to 0 in Albania.

Ethnic Fractionalization

While much of the Muslim world is characterized by sectarianism, ethnic fractionalization does not appear to be significantly associated with democratization. This lack of a relationship is contrary to earlier theories.³¹ Ethnic fractionalization is, however, associated with a challenging environment for institutions as they attempt to include minority groups but preserve governing effectiveness and efficiency.³² Institutional design is a particularly salient concern for many countries in the Muslim world, as those that govern by coalitions are often stymied by frequent dissolutions and changes of alliances that prevent government action.

Islamism

Islamist political parties, like the Muslim Brotherhood, are often associated with extreme social conservatism, which is sometimes viewed as antithetical to democracy. Paradoxically, these parties can be the dominant force pushing for democratization and democratic transition within the current regime.³³ Many experts believe that this is not because Islamist political parties are necessarily rooted in democratic ideals, but rather as an attempt to gain power within the state-controlled governance system. This split between the actions of the big Islamist political parties and their goals is a stark one – and one that makes some Muslims wary of democratic transition.³⁴ However, some believe that incorporating Islamist parties into democratic institutions can have a moderating influence on them.³⁵

Many Islamist political parties and movements are extremely well developed, in terms of their communications, networks and outreach, and resources.³⁶ They highlight that the Islamist groups are decidedly non-secular and carry with them firm agendas that are contrary to the interests of women, ethnic minorities and broad political, civil and social rights and freedoms. As a result, these groups may paradoxically align themselves with the secular, often autocratic, regime.³⁷ Some Islamist parties have been elected in the Muslim world – in Pakistan in 2005, Turkey in 2002, Egypt in 2005 and the Palestinian Territories in 2006. Some of these parties have focused on service delivery as a way to win popular support and to create a “different than the regime” reputation among the people.

However, others are skeptical about the story that democracy will bring a long-term democratic triumph of the Islamist political parties.³⁸ Islamist political parties are often the only (at the very least, the most well-funded and well-organized) opposition to the regime. This suggests that current popular support may be more a product of ‘voting against the state’ than voting for the Islamist party itself. And the interaction of Islamist parties with Islamic extremism and terrorism may be detrimental to widespread support

for the parties. It is also unclear whether Islamist parties that court voters through provision of infrastructure and services will or can maintain these activities beyond the campaign and early governance period. After three years of Islamist governance in the frontier province in Pakistan, the Islamist coalition was voted out in 2008. Support for Hamas in Gaza is estimated to have dropped off after its election.

Evidence is mixed on whether Islamic political parties are good or bad for democratic goals and democratization.³⁹ One study compared the impact of these parties in Turkey and Egypt and found that in Turkey, Islamist parties helped to improve institutional legitimacy and decrease conflict.⁴⁰ However, Turkey may be a unique case.⁴¹ The ruling Justice and Development Party, although it has Islamist roots, has made many reforms at the behest of the European Union and has campaigned on a pro-EU platform. However, in Egypt during the Mubarak era, Islamist parties had the opposite effect – their inclusion reduced state legitimacy, increased conflict, and pushed the Islamic movement to be more conservative.⁴² The perceived co-option of Islamic institutions such as Al-Azhar in Egypt by the government has also decreased legitimacy for both institutions.

It is clear that the relationship between Islam and democracy is nuanced. Islamist parties are often the only legitimate opposition to the state, and can be a mobilizing force for democratization and a strong provider of social services.⁴³ Democracy is popular throughout most Muslim majority countries, but the definitions of democracy may not all be the same. As we saw in the 2011 protests across the Middle East, access to social media and socioeconomic conditions can be a driver for democracy, but do not guarantee change. These are the relationships that policy makers must understand in calibrating how to handle the changing realities in the Muslim World.

Terrorism

The relationship between democracy, Islam and terrorism in the Muslim world is nuanced and controversial. While some think that Islam has a particular effect on support for terrorism, others point to more secular causes such as nationalism. As more quantitative data becomes available about regime type as predictor of terrorism, the lack of consensus in the scholarly community continues to thrive.⁴⁴ Few data exists about the motivations and support for terrorism, topics that are difficult to measure and that are relevant to quell terrorism worldwide. Uncovering public opinion about these issues is therefore extremely important to fill this gap for scholars and policy makers.

Regime Types and Terrorism

Is there something about democracies that decrease the likelihood of terrorism? Are democracies more likely to be the victims of terrorist attacks, if so, why? Conventional wisdom in policy circles is that democracy decreases the incentives for terrorism, because democratic rules and institutions allow individuals to change policy without resorting to violence.⁴⁵ Democracies can also facilitate terrorism because the presence of civil liberties, such as the freedom of assembly, makes it easier for terrorists to organize and conduct their activities.⁴⁶

Democracies as Terrorist Targets

After the attacks of September 11, many asked if democracies were more likely to become targets of terrorist attacks. Some, like Eubank and Weinberg, argue that terrorists are more likely to originate from democracies,⁴⁷ are also more likely to attack stable democracies⁴⁸ and in many cases to attack the same state from which they originated. One explanation is that authoritarian regimes do a better job at counter-terrorism, and democracies are just easier targets.⁴⁹ In addition, authoritarian regimes tend to under-report acts of terrorism;⁵⁰ therefore, terrorists are more likely to attack democratic states where their message of terror will more likely spread.⁵¹

However, the aforementioned reporting bias does not reveal the true extent of terrorism in authoritarian regimes and the literature also shows that democratic participation actually reduces the number of transnational terrorist incidents in a country.⁵² Some scholars find no correlation between regime type and terrorism,⁵³ while others have shown that that it is actually the transition to democracy that increases the likelihood of violence in a country⁵⁴ and the likelihood of a terrorist attack.⁵⁵ These theories are particularly relevant in light of the current political transitions in the Muslim world.

Islam and Terrorism

Terrorism is often linked with Islam, as a significant proportion of such attacks have been committed by organizations like Al-Qaeda, Hamas and others who claim to be religiously motivated.⁵⁶ Perhaps there is something about Islam that makes terrorism more likely,⁵⁷ or perhaps it is the cultural differences associated with religion⁵⁸ that lead to cultural clashes. Islamic civil wars tend to be more violent, last longer and result in more casualties.⁵⁹ One explanation for this fact is the notion of jihad, and the perceived reward in the afterlife for acts on the ground. The geopolitics of many Muslim states, including location near oil, geographic disputes with Israel, etc. also plays a large role.⁶⁰ Religion may not be the primary driver for conflict, but religious differences can help to demonize others,⁶¹ and when there are religious differences between occupiers and the occupied,

it increases the chance of a terrorist attack.⁶² Religion, however, is not the only factor. Even amongst Islamic suicide attacks, one-third were committed by groups with secular orientations.⁶³

Motivations for Terrorism

Why do people support acts of terror? One explanation is linked to nationalism - that terrorism is a rational tool exercised by low status individuals in high stakes conflicts with a more powerful group.⁶⁴ Terrorist organizations are in competition for fighters, funds and infrastructure, and terrorism is a way to achieve these ends through the publicity from terrorist attacks.⁶⁵ Terrorism, while carried out by an isolated few, may have widespread support that cuts across socioeconomic and religious lines and is “more mainstream than others realize; they generally reflect quite common, straightforward nationalist self-determination claims from their community.”⁶⁶ According to Robert Pape’s influential work on suicide bombing, these attacks are popular because they “work” as a nationalist strategy fighting against perceived occupiers, particular if those occupiers are democracies.⁶⁷ He points to Turkey, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, and Israel as places where suicide campaigns have been “successful.”⁶⁸ Similarly, the likelihood of terrorism increases when the citizens of one country disapprove of the political leadership of another.⁶⁹

V. REGIONAL CLEAVAGES

Full democracies are rare in most of the Muslim world compared with the non-Muslim world. In spite of significant disruption across the region, from civil war to foreign occupation to political conflict to interstate warfare, the level of democratization has remained stable since the 1970s. Authoritarianism has remained the governing institution of choice for quite some time.⁷⁰ And these authoritarian governments have endured through significant challenges from conflicts to corruption and a lack of legitimacy. This authoritarianism, however, is currently being challenged by popular revolts, especially in the Middle East.

In spite of the continued dominance of autocracy, there are a few countries that have made significant progress in democratization, including Turkey, Malaysia, Albania, Niger, Senegal and Mali (see Table 3 and Table A15). And within the autocratic countries, many countries have opened politically in the past few decades, although some of this progress has stagnated and even contracted since 2000.⁷¹ Even in places where democratization failed to result in fundamental democratic reforms, the Muslim world was permanently affected by the global normative push for democratization. While the Muslim world was not completely changed, many of its institutions, power structures, and relations between the governed and the government were fundamentally shifted in some way.⁷² Many Muslim countries have also seen an economic transformation in a newly powerful middle class that is challenging the past dominance of the elite.⁷³ Another recent factor is the opening impact of the Internet through its reach in information and communications.

Table 3. Indicators of democracy in the Muslim World. (For comprehensive country list see Table A15)


	Democracy	Government Effectiveness	Corruption	Elections	Political Part.	Freedom of Speech
Bangladesh	-6	-0.8	2	3	5	0
Egypt	-3	-0.43	2.9	1	4	1
Indonesia	8	-0.39	2.3	11	13	1
Jordan	-3	0.22	4.7	2	6	0
Kuwait	-7	0.19	4.3	4	9	1
Lebanon	7	-0.59	3	4	7	1
Malaysia	3	1.11	5.1	6	7	0
Mali	7	-0.58	2.7	9	12	1
Morocco	-6	-0.12	3.5	4	7	0
Nigeria	4	-0.98	2.2	3	9	0
Pakistan	2	-0.6	2.4	2	4	1
Senegal	8	-0.34	3.6	9	12	0
Turkey	7	0.23	4.1	10	12	0
Regional Avg.	-1.2	-0.5	2.9	4	5.6	0.3
World Avg.	3.7	-0.1	3.9	7.7	10	1

Note: Democracy score is from Polity Score (p_polity2) and ranges from -10 (least democratic) to 10 (most democratic). Effectiveness score is from the World Bank (wbgi_gee) and ranges from -2.5 (least effective) to 2.5 (most effective). Corruption score is from Transparency International (ti_cpi) and ranges from 0 (most corrupt) to 10 (most clean). Elections score is from Freedom House (fh_ep) and ranges from 0 (worst processes) to 12 (best processes). Participation score is from Freedom House (fh_ppp) and ranges from 0 (worst participation) to 16 (best participation). Freedom of Speech comes from the Cingranelli & Richards Human Rights Dataset and ranges from 0 (complete government censorship or ownership) to 1 (partial) to 2 (no government censorship or ownership). Source: Quality of Governance dataset, version March 2010. Data from 2007.

The Muslim world faces significant and widespread challenges to democratization across the board. It continues to struggle on its overall democratic rating, government effectiveness, corruption of government, elections, political participation and freedom of speech and media. There are some very interesting exceptions, including regional leaders and countries that have inconsistent performance across categories. Strong overall performers include Albania, Bangladesh, Comoros, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Turkey. It is interesting to note that none of these countries, with the possible exception of Turkey, are in the Muslim Middle East. Among this list, however, the vast majority struggled in government effectiveness – most received negative ratings in this category. Conversely, a number of Muslim Middle Eastern countries performed quite well in government effectiveness, especially the oil-rich countries in the Gulf, but struggled in the democratic processes and outcomes indicators.

One factor that provides a unique challenge to government effectiveness and institutional processes is the high ethnic and linguistic fractionalization found in many Muslim majority countries (see Figure 4). Interestingly, the Muslim world contains significant variance on ethnic and linguistic fractionalization, with some countries – like Bangladesh and Tunisia – very low, and others – like Indonesia, Mali, Nigeria and Pakistan – very high.

Figure 4. Degree of ethnic and linguistic fractionalization.



Source: Quality of Governance dataset, version March 2010. Data from 2007.

An additional governance challenge is found in the overlap of the military and the civilian government. In 2007, 21 countries in the Muslim world had military officers as either the Chief Executive or the Defense Minister (see Table A16). This generally moves along with inappropriate balance of power between the government and the military, a lack of independence of the executive and a lack of enforcement of executive decisions. It is also associated with infringement of human rights and legal protections of citizens.


The regional average for the Muslim world of women in parliament continues to lag behind the world average (see Figure A17). While countries like Lebanon and Somalia are at the extreme low end of women's representation, the Muslim world does contain some positive standouts, with Senegal, Afghanistan and Tunisia exceeding the world average.

While the Muslim world is broadly characterized by political terror, failed states

tend to be concentrated in North Africa and Central Asia (see Figure A18). Religious freedom tends to be severely restricted, but religious fractionalization varies greatly between countries (see Figure A19).

The Muslim world is also facing a youth bulge – a rise in youth that are educated, connected to the Internet and social media, and yet unemployed (see Figure 5). Most Muslim countries have overwhelmingly young populations where at least 40 percent are below 30. This demographic is an important pressure on regimes in the Muslim world, and as seen in Tunisia and Egypt, can play an essential role in communicating, organizing, and mobilizing broader discontent.

Figure 5. Youth unemployment and internet usage.



Source: CIA World Factbook and the International Labor Organization.

The elite divide: Our interviews routinely highlighted the perceptions of growing inequality between rich and poor. Interview subjects referenced this not just in terms of economic wealth, but also in terms of disparities in access to public services, infrastructure and employment opportunities. We heard of a growing alienation between individuals and the state, and between different communities. The quantitative data reinforces this position, showing a significant and widening income gap within many countries in the Middle East. This divide highlights the importance of reaching these different communities with the public opinion polls. It also points out that in many countries, the elite and the affluent are increasingly isolated from the needs and priorities of the poor. It is striking that during our interviews with Egyptian elites, just a few days before widespread protests broke out, every person we interviewed stated emphatically that Tunisia-style riots could never happen in Egypt. While we cannot be sure what explains this lack of foresight, it could be that the elite are simply cut off from new organizing and communications networks, that they are more pessimistic due to past anti-regime events and history, or that there are different values being fostered.

Regional Nuances & Future Trends

US Relations and the Muslim World

Support for the United States: Support for the United States increased slightly with the election of Barack Obama, but the perception from most of our interviews is that support for the United States and its leaders is most influenced by America's foreign policy, with particular attention to Iraq, Afghanistan and Israel. In light of the current revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia, there are strong perceptions that the United States supports authoritarian regimes at the expense of democracy, leading to increased resentment of the United States in the Muslim World. This being said, the same individual may have a different opinion in regards to support for the American people, support for American ideals and support for American leadership and specific US policies. It is important to disaggregate support for the office of the US President, and support for the American people.

US Image: Recent changes in 2010-2011 may influence the way that individuals view the United States. These changes include confidential information made public from Wikileaks and the Palestine Papers. Changes also include perceived role in the Egyptian revolution, recent military involvement in Libya, the lack of military response in Syria and Bahrain, the continued US military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, worries about Iran's nuclear program, the US economy and a rising China.

Democratization

Democratization: In our interviews we often heard that while there is broad support for democracy in the Muslim World, there are differing conceptions of what democracy entails and what part of democracies are most important. For example, in Egypt we often heard that democratic principles were less important than economic stability, perceived corruption and the ability to provide social services. To uncover these differing perceptions of democracy, it would be relevant to ask an open-ended question about what democracy means or ask individuals to rank different elements of democracy.

Democratic Trends: Support for democratic movements has swept the Arab World and beyond. Events that started in Tunisia have created an infectious spirit for democracy; this enthusiasm will likely be significant in upcoming public opinion polls. Support for “America’s ideas about democracy” will either increase with the democracy trend or results will be biased by individuals that support democracy, but do not want the Arab movements to be associated with the United States. The question about whether the United States supports democracy where it serves their interests will likely rise as many perceived a disconnect between America’s support for democracy in Iraq or Libya and the US response in Egypt, Bahrain and Syria. .

Technology and Social Media: In our interviews, individuals had different perspectives on the importance of technology and social media to connect individuals to social and political issues, to spread knowledge and to mobilize individuals quickly against the state. There is wide variance of individuals with access to the Internet between and within countries (the Gulf states, for example, have extremely high coverage compared to poorer Muslim-majority countries). The relationship between technology and sparking social change warrants attention. Questions to consider include who uses social media and the amount of time spent on political, religious and social networks. It may also be interesting to correlate data on social media with levels of religiosity, attitudes about democracy, educational level, income, freedom of speech, age and other interesting indicators.

The Judiciary and Military: The military and the judiciary are often seen as moderating and liberalizing forces in society that can mobilize social change. These institutions, however, can also be seen as a vehicle to promote authoritarianism. This begs the questions: Can the military be an effective vehicle to promote democracy? What role should the military have in government? Other factors to consider include the trust of these institutions in comparison to the state, support for the military in times of transition and satisfaction with military-led governments.

Islamism

Islamic Resurgence: During our interviews there was consensus on the increased presence of Islamic symbols and support for Islamist movements in the Muslim World. All of the individuals we spoke to said that the Islamic resurgence has caused individuals to identify themselves more according to their religion than their national identity, which has caused them to “other” individuals of different faiths. To test this theory, individuals would be asked if they identify themselves first by their religion, then their nationality or vice-versa. Questions about feelings of religiosity may have changed over time.

Religious Tolerance: In Egypt and Lebanon, religious discrimination was raised as an issue. In Egypt this manifested in clashes between Copts and Muslims, and in Lebanon this is seen in increased Confessionalism and religious polarization between all religions. It should be noted that problems of religious freedom include Muslims living in Muslim-majority states that have “secular” governments. In countries like Turkey or in Ben Ali’s Tunisia, there are state limits on the public display of Islam, including restrictions on the headscarf, and other forms of perceived discrimination against symbols of Muslim religiosity.

We recommend that our client be aware of this phenomenon and ask about perceptions of religious freedom and the equality of all citizens. In Egypt, we often heard that Coptic community members feel they are treated as second-class citizens; in this context, it would be interesting to discover if and how religious identity plays a role in the way that the state treats individuals/citizens. Asking if Muslims are (or should be) treated differently than non-Muslims, for example if non-Muslims should serve in the military, may reveal individual attitudes.

Islamist Parties: Islamist organizations continued to pop up around the Muslim World as one of the driving forces of opposition to the state. As seen with support for Hamas, Hezbollah, Turkey’s Justice and Development Party and the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamist parties often receive support for their ability to promote democracy, as a vehicle for opposition to authoritarian regimes, to create freedom of speech, and the ability to provide social services to the state. Rather, the drivers of support include perceptions of a less corrupt alternative to the state, the ability to provide social services and military protection against external actors (primarily Israel). As opposed to just rating support for organizations such as Hamas, Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda, we recommend that our client work to uncover the drivers of support for these organizations. Important questions include the perceived corruption of these groups in comparison to the state and the efficacy of organizations in supporting social services. Other things to uncover include support for the religious ideology of these organizations, and asking if organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood are (or should be) drivers for democracy.

Terrorism

Religion and Support for Hamas, Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda: There is wide disagreement on the ground about what organizations should be considered terrorist groups in the Muslim World. Support for Hamas, Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda differ greatly. For some, Hamas and Hezbollah are legitimate political actors that have representation in government, provide social services and participate in elections. Locally, they are perceived by some as militant religious organizations that have primarily nationalist aspirations and are engaged in regional conflicts, as opposed to the international scope of Al-Qaeda. We also noticed that support for Hamas and Hezbollah were not always linked to Islamic identity or support for perceived religious ideology. Many supporters of both groups are not Muslim and do not have any ideological affinity to the religious identity of these groups.

There are tremendous ideological differences between Shi'a organizations such as Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda, and support for both organizations is likely influenced by the perceived ability of each group to act in opposition to the "West" and Israel, and the perceived threat that these groups pose internally. It is important to uncover the drivers of support of these groups by asking questions about perceptions of their level of religiosity, their level of corruption and if an individual would like to live in an area governed by these groups. It is also important to put these groups in the context of globalization and national identity.

Hezbollah: Support for Hezbollah will be contingent on many factors including the release of the International Tribunal for Lebanon and how Hezbollah reacts. The Hezbollah-led March 8 Government is currently in power in Lebanon. Its rise to power can be viewed as part of the larger revolutions in the Arab World and is seen as anti-American and anti-corruption. However, many do not like Hezbollah's Islamist and Iranian ties, and many in Lebanon are afraid of Hezbollah's weapons, which they view pose a threat to Lebanese internal security. If members of Hezbollah are arrested for the assassination of Rafik Hariri, support for the movement would likely decrease significantly.

Al-Qaeda: During our interviews, many experts claimed that Al-Qaeda's primary appeal was that it provided an opposition to the West that was not being provided by many authoritarian rulers across the Muslim World. With the recent democracy movements in the Middle East, this support may decrease, as there are now alternative movements to support that are "anti-Imperialist" but not Wahhabi in nature.

Suicide Bombings: Most of the protests in the Arab world began as non-violent revolutions, showing that change can occur without violence. This may translate into a decrease of popular support for suicide bombings. Support for suicide bombings has also decreased in some countries that have experienced the impacts of bombings firsthand (for example Turkey and Pakistan).

The Popularity of World Leaders: In our interviews, we noticed that the popularity of world leaders was tied to the foreign policies of their respective countries. Popularity was also tied to leaders' willingness to "stand up" to the US. It is important to disaggregate this "anti-imperialist" aspect from popularity of specific policy stances. For example, polling on a leader known to challenge US policies would create a baseline of popularity that could then be compared to the popularity of Ahmadinejad to determine how popular his specific policies and issue stances are.

Youth: It was pointed out during our research that 2010-2011 is the United Nations' International Year of Youth, which may be an interesting angle on how to present polling data. One of the cleavages that we saw in the Middle East was of the youth population. In many countries throughout the Middle East (especially Turkey, Iran and Iraq) there is a youth bulge that is putting considerable pressure on the state. The youth, through social media, have been a powerful force in the protests sweeping the Middle East. Youth, even those with university education, are also a demographic set vulnerable to unemployment. The protest in Tunisia was prompted by the actions of an unemployed university graduate. We suggest that particular attention be placed on youth populations regarding issues such as perceived levels of religiosity, media literacy, support for democracy, employment opportunities, ability to find a spouse, the ability to procure reasonable housing and support for Islamist movements.

Dignity: In our interviews, we also heard that one of the reasons for the revolutions in the Middle East is a perceived loss of dignity. This was one of the main slogans during the Egyptian revolutions and was cited as the cause of Muhamed Bouaziz's decision to self-immolate in Tunisia, sparking that country's revolution. While dignity has become a common narrative during the change across the Middle East, it is unclear what its causes and components are. It may be worth asking about expectations about employment opportunities, government performance and political freedom. These expectations can be measured against the past, to see if the Middle East (or the entire Muslim World) is feeling more or less optimistic about its future.

US-Led Effort to Fight Terrorism: While the resurgence of Arab pride is evident across the region, it is unclear how this will affect the region. We also expect to see changes in support for President Obama, interacting with the resolution of Libya, US foreign policy towards Syria and Bahrain and general perceptions about the promotion of democracy. The threat of religious conflict will likely increase in Lebanon due to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and the collapse of the Hariri government, acts which reinforced sectarianism in the country, an aspect which can also be applied to Bahrain. The question of religious hatred in Egypt is contingent upon the actions of the Muslim Brotherhood, attacks on the Christian minority and whether the religious groups can come together to

support candidates in the upcoming elections. The gap between rich and poor will likely continue to be a significant, if not pivotal, issue. The revolutions in the Arab world were largely sparked by unemployment and lack of opportunity; it would not be surprising if concern over this issue grew as well across the board.

VI. COUNTRY CASE STUDY: EGYPT

*“We are a broken people. They broke us with poverty.
They broke us with corruption. They broke us with ignorance.”*
–Egyptian youth commenting on the loss of dignity felt by Egyptians

Much has changed in Egypt in the last few months. After eighteen days of mass protest, the 30-year rule of General Mubarak has come to an end.


The future of Egypt, and its impact on the Muslim world has yet to be seen.

Egypt is a country in transition. This country of 85 million people, the largest in the Middle East, has just ended 30 years of rule by the Mubarak government, and the future of the country is uncertain. Until February 2011, Egypt was considered an extremely stable authoritarian state (see Table 6 and Figure 7). Although it held nominal elections, it is to this point (as the indicators have not caught up with recent events) considered “not free,” and it consistently scores below the world average on almost all democratic indicators (see Table A15). Egypt scored particularly low, below world and MENA averages, for political participation, democracy and stability of democratic institutions. In other words, Egypt has stronger governance institutions than democratic ones, as seen by the relatively high Polity score for government effectiveness compared to voice and accountability (see Figure 7). Ironically, Egypt – as well as Tunisia -- scored highest in rule of law, government effectiveness, political stability and stateness (the stability of the state).

Table 6. Summary indicators.

Democracy Score	Status	Population	Median Age	Internet Users	Poverty
-3	Not Free	80.5 million	24	20 million	20%

Note: Democracy score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic). Source: Quality of Governance dataset, version March 2010, data used from 2008; the CIA World Factbook 2011; and UNDP.

Figure 7. Recent trends in Egypt.

Note: Indicators taken from World Bank variables, measuring from -2.5 (worse) to 2.5 (better). Source: Quality of Governance dataset version March 2010.

We arrived in Egypt on January 16, almost one month after Mohamed Bouaziz in Tunisia immolated himself to death, and two days after Tunisian President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali fled Tunisia. At that time Egyptians were already preparing for the January 24 protests in Tahrir Square, but no one that we spoke to (including those planning to participate in the protest) thought that more than 20,000 people would demonstrate or that it would have any significant impact on the current regime. Everywhere we went, people were excitedly talking about Tunisia, but when it came to change in Egypt the tone across the board was negative, frustrated, angry and defeatist. Although no one knew that a revolution was coming, in retrospect there were definite clues that the situation was ripe for change.

Democratization

Elections: The anger and frustration in Egypt was partially due to the 2010 elections that everyone saw as being egregiously and conspicuously rigged. One interviewee said, “It is as if the government wasn’t even trying to make it look legitimate.” There was a general perception that these elections were more fraudulent than ones in the past. No civil society groups or election monitors were allowed to participate in these elections, and they were boycotted by the Muslim Brotherhood. Egypt has just had its first elections

since the ousting of Mubarak, to place term limits on the President and to increase judicial oversight over voting, and people voted in record numbers. Presidential and parliamentary elections are expected later this year.

Democracy: There is a poverty gradient to support democracy. There is strong support for democracy in Egypt, however, there is a disconnect between the ideals of democracy and the daily lives of individuals. Most Egyptians are of the peasant class - the major backbone of political support for the NDP. Some feel that these individuals are too busy caring about their next meal to be engaged in championing for democracy. We were told that only when the average Egyptian can connect democracy to economic interest or religion would there be democratic reform. It would be interesting to see how much of the current Egyptian revolution was elite led and linked to economic opportunity.

Corruption: Corruption is a widespread and significant concern. Before the changes in Egypt, corruption was both overt and extremely visible, covered all aspects of Egyptian society and was part of the entire political system. Egypt scores poorly in international corruption indexes (see Figure 7). Public servants' salaries are low, which incentivizes corruption.

Income Distribution: The distribution of income between rich and poor is growing. The social safety net of the Nasser era has languished and many Egyptians fall between the cracks. Even before the protests, economic/worker demonstrations were increasing in Egypt. These economic demonstrations were particularly focused on wages and the increasing price of commodities. Most protests were of this nature up until the revolution. It would be interesting to see how these strikes led to the protests to oust Mubarak and how income distribution will affect support for democracy in the future.

Freedom of Press: Press freedom in Egypt is “partially free,” according to Freedom House,⁷⁴ primarily due to the significant legal restrictions on the media. We were told repeatedly that Egypt would not break like Tunisia, because there is a degree of freedom of speech and civil society that allows the society to “breathe” under authoritarianism. There are twenty-one newspapers, fifteen of which are independent. There are active blogs and the civil society leaders we talked to were comfortable going on the record about their criticisms of the regime. This freedom, however, was seen to stop when it has the ability to bring people to the streets.

For example, although Egypt is the most polled country in the Muslim world, it is also one of the worst places to freely conduct polling. Every poll in Egypt has to go through a central ministry and is highly regulated. The elite is usually over-represented in the survey data as they are easiest to track and are the best informed (this may be particu-

larly true when it comes to phone interviews). We were told that local polls are highly regulated because of their power to bring people together by giving them a collective voice. The fear is that this could mobilize individuals to take to the street.

Social Media: General literacy in Egypt is 71.4 percent, and of the country’s 80 million people, 13.5 percent are Internet users (see Table 6). Social media tends to be concentrated with the youth population, and most of the blogging is social and increasingly religious -- only 20 percent of the blogging is political. Although there is an active cluster on the Internet, it is a small number, and is seen to be too small to mobilize all of Egyptian society. Social media was used to mobilize during the protests and cutting off the Internet by the government was seen as an egregious violation of what had been considered a right.

Military: The judiciary and the military are viewed as the least corrupt parts of Egyptian society. The military has a strong history in Egypt. The military is currently guiding the Egyptian political transition, and attitudes towards the military have been mixed since the ousting of Mubarak. As the protests continue, it remains to be seen how the military will react and how attitudes towards the military will change. The Egyptian military is also comprised of different levels of soldiers, established officers and young officers who have different incentives to keep the old institutions. These divisions in the military may also affect the political transition in Egypt. The military is distinct from the intelligence services, which was responsible for much of the internal suppression in Egypt.

The judiciary and the Supreme Constitutional Court are generally highly regarded and are powerful tools to decrease corruption. Egypt similarly scores well on rule of law indicators. However, the judicial institutions are understaffed and can be manipulated for political purposes. Egypt is currently negotiating new legal and constitutional reforms, increasing the role of the court for Egypt’s political transition.

Islamism

Increased Presence of Islam in Society: All of our interviewees agreed that Egypt has become increasingly Islamic. One narrative is that the state suppressed all of the secular opposition movements, leaving only the mosques and universities as places of opposition. In order to compete with the appeal of the Muslim Brotherhood, the government tried to “co-opt” religion by using more rhetoric and religious symbols to become more salafists than the Muslim Brotherhood. The Mubarak regime, although labeled “secular” by the West, was actually not secular, and its growing use of religion led to a perceived exclusion of non-Muslims.

Al Azhar: There is a strong but complicated relationship between the government and Al Azhar (the premier institution of Islamic learning). The head of Al-Azhar is appointed by the state, and although it is always jockeying for autonomy, Al-Azhar will often issue fatwas to support state policy. Many believe that this relationship decreases the legitimacy of Al-Azhar. Conversely, Al-Azhar has the moral authority that the state does not have and often influences state policy as a voice of opposition. Because the mosques were used as a way to mobilize the protests, it will be interesting to see the influence of the ulema (clergy) on the new Egyptian government.

Headscarf: One indicator for the increased presence of Islam in society is the growing number of women wearing the “hijab” (headscarf) and to a lesser extent the “niqab” (face veil). The hijab has become a cultural as well as a religious symbol, and we were warned that the increased presence of the hijab does not necessarily lead to increased support for Islam in government, increased use of the Shari’a, or the Muslim Brotherhood. It would be interesting to show this statistically.

Islam and the West: One narrative we heard during our interviews suggests that Egyptian society has also become more Islamized because they feel that Islam is under attack from the West. The belief that the West has consistently supported authoritarian regimes against the people has increased support for Islamic opposition

Muslim-Christian Relations: When we left Egypt, the situation between Coptic Christians and Muslims was tense. During December 2010 and January 2011, there were increasing protests/riots and bloodshed from both sides. The most dramatic event was a bombing and shooting in Alexandria on Eastern Christmas Eve, where over 24 worshippers were killed in a church. Some estimate that there have been 162 major mass attacks on the Coptic community since 1972. Egypt does not have any major border disputes or ethnic and linguistic differences, so the major divisions are on religious lines. Christians represent around 10 percent of Egyptian society,⁷⁵ although there is no official count. Christians cannot make repairs to any churches without a presidential decree and Christians are statistically under-represented in government (2 percent in government and 1 percent in Parliament). This has led to increased Confessionalism, where individuals look to their religious group before the state. However, as there were many images of Muslims and Christians coming together during the protests to oust Mubarak, it would be relevant to see if the discriminatory clauses in the constitution will be removed with a new government or if relations will be improved in the future.

Youth: The youth are characterized as being more focused on their religion than in the past, perhaps because the governments were more secular. We were told that in the past people identified themselves more as “Egyptian” than as “Muslim/Christian;”

however, during the Mubarak era this started to change. On the eve of the revolution there was a pervasive perception that young Egyptians would mobilize for Islamic causes worldwide, but will not do so for domestic economic issues. There was also a growing fear that the youth Copts and Muslims were becoming increasingly radicalized.

Clearly, the view of the power of youth has changed since the revolution. In early 2011, “the noble youth of the revolution” became a symbol of the hope of the revolution as young people were instrumental in the ousting of Mubarak. It remains to be seen what cleavages will occur between the youth and older cohorts as the country wrestles with the formation of a new government.

Support for the Muslim Brotherhood: Historically, the Muslim Brotherhood has been a lower middle class movement; its support comes from the big cities of the provinces. Few come from religious backgrounds and few are workers and peasants. It is an alternative community that espouses to provide social services and discourse of movement, a just political order, and cultural authenticity. It is not one monolithic organization but includes many different beliefs and opinions. The Brotherhood aims to address the spiritual, political, and economic needs of those in its movement and individuals participate in many different ways. Although they are a banned party, the Brotherhood did very well in the 2005 elections running as independents, but their win quelled protests for reform both in Egypt and abroad. Those in Egypt felt that there was more political freedom and those abroad backed off the calls for democracy for fear that the Muslim Brotherhood would take over.

Since then, the Brotherhood has not participated in elections. Before the ousting of Mubarak we heard that in upcoming elections the Brotherhood would only receive about 10-15 percent support. However in the post-Mubarak era, as new political parties scramble to organize themselves, the Brotherhood is well-positioned with its established organizational structure. Although the Brotherhood has currently put a limit on the amount of seats they will seek in the upcoming elections, and won’t field a presidential candidate, members of the organization may seek to run as independents.

Terrorism

Support for Hamas and Hezbollah: From our interviews, we heard that Hezbollah is popular as it is seen as David standing up to the Goliath Israel, but that it is also feared as a Shi’a organization linked with Iran. These support survey findings of 30 percent favorability rating for Hezbollah. Hamas has a 49 percent favorability rating as it is seen that Hamas “won” the Gaza war. However, many also believe that Hamas is corrupt and may be in cahoots with Israel (although not as much as the Palestinian Authority). From a governmental point of view, Hamas is linked with support for the Muslim Brotherhood and is judged accordingly.

US Relations with Egypt: Perceptions of the US are primarily shaped by US foreign policy. This credibility was particularly damaged due to perceptions of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, US support for Israel (especially during the wars in Gaza and Lebanon) and US support for dictators. This was seen to be particularly hypocritical, as the Bush Doctrine of pro-democracy rhetoric was counteracted with support for Mubarak due to foreign policy concerns. There are also perceptions that the US backed away from democracy promotion due to the fear that the Muslim Brotherhood (who made a great showing in 2005) would come to full power. Obama's brief rise in popularity is overwhelmed by America's foreign policy. It remains to be seen how US foreign policy in Libya, Bahrain, Israel, Syria and US economic and political support for Egypt changes public opinion.

Support for Iran & Turkey: The perception is that most Egyptians do not like the threat of Iran and the Egyptian government is anti-Iranian. However, Iran is gaining popularity due to its anti-imperialistic stance (anti-Israeli and anti-American), much like there is support for Hugo Chavez. Similarly, there is large support for Erdogan and the Turkish model.

Women: The attitudes in Egypt about the ability for women to work have changed out of necessity. As the economy worsens, most households need a dual income, so women are needed and encouraged to work. We heard anecdotally that more women are wearing the headscarf now than in the past. This is pointed to by some as proof of increased religiosity or radicalization of young women, but many view it as a cultural phenomenon that is related to the increased presence of women in the workforce and other cultural factors that may not be linked with religiosity.

VII. COUNTRY CASE STUDY: LEBANON

“We should consider ourselves lucky. Lebanon was saved the fate of brutal dictators. The confessions are too busy fighting against each other to have a strong state.”
 –Lebanese academic joking about why Lebanon is not like Egypt

Lebanon is a **multi-religious Confessional state** with a **history of foreign intervention** in the country.

On January 25 of 2010 the **Hezbollah-led March 8th government gained power** one week after the National Unity Government headed by Sa’ad Hariri collapsed.

This collapse was prompted by the expected release of the United Nations Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which is expected to indict Hezbollah for the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005.

In the last decade Lebanon has experienced the **removal of Israeli (2000) and Syrian (2005) troops from Lebanese soil.**

Lebanon is an exceptional case in the Middle East. It was created as the only Christian state in the Middle East, and its history and democratic institutions are distinct from the rest of its Arab neighbors. When it comes to democratic governance, Lebanon is consistently an outlier in its region, and has the highest democracy score in the Arab Middle East (see Table A15). Lebanon scores well on political participation, rule of law, political social integration, and is known for having strong stable democratic institutions (see Figure 9). The country enjoys a moderate degree of freedom of speech, a relatively high degree of political participation (see Table A15) and strong democratic institutions.


Table 8. Summary indicators.

Democracy Score	Status	Population	Median Age	Internet Users	Poverty
7	Partially Free	4.14 million	29.8	1 million	28.5%

Note: Democracy score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic). Source: Quality of Governance dataset, version March 2010, data used from 2008; the CIA World Factbook 2011; and UNDP.

These statistics, however, hide a high degree of political instability. In the last decade Lebanon has experienced the withdrawal of both Israeli and Syrian forces from its soil, and has twice come into crisis over the role of Hezbollah, its arms and role in government. The 2006 war with Israel, and the ensuing instability, negatively affected Lebanon in regards to corruption, government effectiveness, and rule of law. Lebanon suffered most greatly in terms of the strength of the state and political stability (see Figure 9). The only indicator where Lebanon has improved since 2002 is voice and accountability.

Figure 9. Recent trends in Lebanon.



Note: Indicators taken from World Bank variables, measuring from -2.5 (worse) to 2.5 (better). Source: Quality of Governance time series dataset version March 2010.

We arrived in Lebanon on January 19, during another period of political instability, almost one week after the collapse of the March 14th coalition government. We left Lebanon on January 24, the day before the Hezbollah-backed March 8th coalition won the elections and Najib Makati became Lebanon's new Prime Minister, much to the dismay of the March 14th supporters. The situation was extremely tense as each day we heard new rumors of protests and the possibility of violence on the street and were warned many times not to stay in Beirut.

International Tribunal: The Special Tribunal for Lebanon was one of the main reasons for the collapse of Hariri's March 14th government. This United Nations tribunal was created to uncover who killed the former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005. There were

speculations as to the role of Syria, but now most Lebanese feel that it is going to indict members of Hezbollah. Feelings about the tribunal seem to be mixed. While most Lebanese want justice and want to know the truth about what happened, many do not support this tribunal because of the political backlash that may result from both sides. There are those who think that the tribunal is biased or is being used as a political ploy to discredit Hezbollah, and to force an internal conflict. Some also feel that the choice of an international tribunal is a mark of mistrust of domestic judicial systems that could even harm the domestic courts in the long-term. It should be noted that everyone that we talked to warned that violence will likely occur once the results of the tribunal are released. As of July, no one had been arrested.

Protests in Syria: The violent crackdown of protests in Syria may have a tremendous effect on their smaller neighbor Lebanon. Once occupied by Syria, Lebanon is faced with the problem of incoming refugees and a spilling-over of political turmoil. Protests have emerged in Lebanon in response to events in Syria, with clashes between factions for and against Syrian President Assad popping up around the country. Events in Syria combined with the Special Tribunal have created an increasingly tense atmosphere in Lebanon. As of July, there have been two major attacks on UN Peacekeeping forces in the South, and fears of further conflict.

Democratization

Lebanon in the Context of the Middle East: As in Egypt, the Lebanese were worried about economic opportunities (especially in relation to the youth), high unemployment rates, political instability, the Arab-Israeli Conflict, the increased presence of Islam in society, perceived Western dominance & hypocrisy, and corruption in government. Other important factors were Confessionalism and a lack of “dignity” of certain segments of the population. As in Egypt, Islamist movements like Hezbollah had wide support due to the social services that they were able to provide and to its perceived opposition to the West (Hezbollah is able to provide opposition to Israel, while the Muslim Brotherhood provides opposition to the Egyptian state). Despite these similarities, the Lebanese case is unique. There is freedom of expression, extremely high educational rates, and strong democratic institutions – accompanied by an extremely weak state. Lebanese politics is dominated by foreign powers and Confessional groupings. Lebanon has lacked the strong dictatorships that exist in most of the Middle East. Lebanon has not completely moved past its Civil War, and struggles with accommodating the needs of all of its confessional groups.

Confessionalism: We often heard that Lebanon does not have a central state, simply a series of sectarian confessional groupings. According to our interviews, one’s religious identification is often more powerful than national identity - the state is just a

meeting space where each community comes together to get what it wants. This problem has existed since the founding of the Lebanese state. Lebanon was founded as a Christian state, with Christian-led institutions and a primarily Muslim majority (Muslims make up 59.7 percent and Christians 39 percent).⁷⁶ The narrative we heard was that the result of the Lebanese Civil War was to give more power to the Muslim populations, but that in 2000, a divide appeared between the Sunni and Shi'a communities. Now the Shi'a community (led by Hezbollah) wants more power in the political system causing disruptions to the status quo. The divide between sects is now evident in polling results where support for Hamas and Hezbollah fall along sectarian lines.

Citizenship: We heard that in Lebanon, citizenship is heavily tied in with the sect to which you belong, which provides services to its own community. If you need anything you turn to people in your sect, not to the central government. Each sect provides its own healthcare, security and education. As there is no standard educational system, each sect has its own affiliated schools, which means that there is no common history book in Lebanon, reinforcing stereotypes. It would be interesting to see how this educational system shapes citizenship and views of individuals from other faiths. It would also be interesting to see how individuals self-identify as nationalist or by religion.

Political Coalitions: Our experts stated repeatedly that Lebanon has democratic institutions but is not a democracy. Rather, it is a series of confessional groupings under the auspices of a weak state. The three main political camps are the March 8th Coalition (led by Hezbollah), the Sunni March 14th Coalition (led by Hariri) and the Democratic Gathering Bloc led by the Druze leader Walid Junblatt. The Christians are split between the March 8th and March 14th Coalition, leaving the small Druze minority tremendous power to steer the government. They recently sided with March 8th, prompting the change in government. It is speculated that the Druze sided with Hezbollah because of the political consequences of not allying with the dominant group in their southern region.

Media Freedom: Lebanon's media is considered to be "Partially Free."⁷⁷ Although there is freedom of speech, the media suffers from legal restrictions and political pressure. In the MENA region, only Iran, Syria, Iraq and Libya scored higher for the influence of political pressure on the country's media. Internet penetration is at 945,000 people (in 2008) out of a population of 4,142,101.⁷⁸

The Economy and Inequality: Beirut is now one of the 10 most expensive cities in which to buy property (partially due to Gulf money coming into downtown Beirut). Also, there is an increased gap between rich and poor. Over 28 percent of Lebanese live below the poverty line.⁷⁹ There are also 405,425 Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon with differing degrees of economic and political opportunities.

Unemployment and Education: There are also problems with unemployment. Over 40 percent of Lebanese have an undergraduate degree – though there is a considerable lack of work opportunities. On average, Lebanese attend 14 years of school.⁸⁰ Over half of young Lebanese are thinking about or actively planning on leaving the country. According to research, the level of emigration is the same across the confessions, but there are many who believe that Christians are leaving at a higher rate than the other sects.

Islamism & Terrorism:

Fear: One of the things that we saw throughout our interviews was the fear that one confession would take over another. Members of March 14th expressed fears that Hezbollah and Iranian influence would take over; Christians expressed fear that if the constitution changes they will be “like the Copts in Egypt,” treated as a persecuted minority or run out of the country.

Political Islam: We heard a narrative similar to that in Egypt – that the secular leftists and pan-Arabists, which became the Ba’athists and Nasserites, overthrew powers in Syria, Iraq and Egypt, but these revolutionaries became authoritarian dictators perpetuating an ossified system. There was no room to challenge the state, so the only spaces available were the university and the mosque. The mosque became the source of resistance and provided social services that the state did not, which increased the presence of Islam in society.

Hezbollah: The relationship between the Lebanese and Hezbollah is very complex. Hezbollah is seen as representing the Shi’a in this confessional structure (we did not hear about other Shi’a groups that were not affiliated with Hezbollah). It is perceived as a political party, provider of social services, a way to bring “dignity” to the Shi’a who felt left out of the system, and, in one narrative, provides Lebanon with a military force to protect from Israel. The problem elucidated by some is that Hezbollah is much better at providing these services than the other confessions and is gaining more power at the expense of the other confessions and the Lebanese “state.” The Lebanese system, as it was laid out to us, is zero-sum. No confession feels that it can allow the others to become stronger because it weakens their own power. While the Lebanese state would like Hezbollah to reduce its army, there is little that the state or the other confessions were willing to trade in return. Hezbollah’s arms, while seen by some as necessary to combat foreign aggression, are highly controversial as they create a state-within-a-state and can lead to instability and violence. Hezbollah’s use of violence has led to its label as a “terrorist organization” by the US Department of State and others.

Support for Hezbollah: Support for Hezbollah comes from many different areas. One strand of support comes from Hezbollah's foreign policy and resistance to Israel. Former Leftists and Pan-Arabists who believed in fighting against Israel have joined Hezbollah, which received large support domestically and from abroad in 2006 after the Lebanese war with Israel. It is seen by some as the only way to protect Lebanon from outsiders. Another strand of support comes from the social services that Hezbollah provides and the perception that Hezbollah is less corrupt than the other leaders. Finally, there are those who believe in Hezbollah on an ideological level and support the discourse of Hassan Nasrullah. Although we surveyed many people from different religions who claimed that they supported Hezbollah for a variety of reasons, we talked to other individuals who felt that Hezbollah's only support came from those who agreed with Hezbollah's ideology (or those who wanted to show they were anti-Imperialist). This showed a huge gap in public perception about support for Hezbollah and the type of people that support Hezbollah.

The Lebanese Shi'a: One group that is little understood in the United States is the Shi'a sect, especially those living in Lebanon. The Shi'a are not one unified group. There are different schools of thought and followers of thought, divided between the ideologies of Qom and Najaf. We were told of Shi'a Hezbollah supporters of varying degree of religiosity. They are distinct from the different political camps of other Islamist groups and have different political alliances.

Arab-Israeli Conflict: As mentioned above, Hezbollah has painted itself as an organization that can "resist" Israel, which has led to some regional popularity. We often heard that this was an antidote to the defeat and humiliation felt in the Arab world (defeat and humiliation were also words used to describe reasons for the Syrian, Tunisian, Yemeni and Egyptian revolutions). It would be interesting to see if people feel more empowered politically and how that affects support for groups like Hezbollah.

Support for Al-Qaeda: We were repeatedly warned not to conflate support for Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda. Although there is at times overlapping support for the two groups, they have very different religious ideologies and political aims.

VIII. COUNTRY CASE STUDY: PAKISTAN

“Who is the silent majority? Now for the first time I am unsure.”

–Pakistani government official, on whether most of society is moderate/secular or extremist

Has a generally **secular constitution**, but **cannot pass laws that are antithetical to Islam**. **Islamic law is implemented** in the Swat Valley. **There is a federal sharia law court.**

Has **significant ethnic and linguistic fractionalization.**

Is characterized by significant **internal conflict**, particularly on its Afghanistan border. India remains a current concern.


Recent political assassinations were tied to **the blasphemy law.**

Pakistan has a state that is relatively strong in some ways, although its effectiveness has been challenged in recent years as instability and domestic insurgents have grown (see Figure 11). It recently improved its democracy score and its status, moving from “not free” to “partly free” (see Figure 11). This transition was helped by the 2008 ousting of the widely disliked dictator Musharraf and the holding of new elections. Its already-strained ties with India were further damaged as a result of the 2008 Mumbai attacks, though some reconciliation has happened recently. Pakistan has moderate unemployment, high poverty and a growing young, internet-connected population (see Table 10). It has one of the highest levels of ethnic and linguistic fractionalizations in the Muslim region (see Figure 4).

Table 10. Summary indicators.

Democracy Score	Status	Population	Median Age	Internet Users	Poverty
5	Partially Free	187.34 million	21.6 years	20.4 million	24%

Note: Democracy score ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to 10 (strongly democratic). Source: Quality of Governance dataset, version March 2010, data used from 2008; the CIA World Factbook 2011; and UNDP.

Figure 11. Recent trends in Pakistan.

Note: Indicators taken from World Bank variables, measuring from -2.5 (worse) to 2.5 (better). Source: Quality of Governance time series dataset version March 2010.

Perhaps the biggest issues in Pakistan today are conflict and security, and Islamic extremism. A recent spate of political assassinations of individuals that criticized the blasphemy law caused many in Pakistan to question the type and scope of Pakistani Islamism. Many Pakistanis are now asking fundamental questions: Are moderates the majority? If not, are the media and other powerful entities being controlled by the extremists? Is this a sign of increasing Islamism in Pakistan? What does this mean for what had been an improving democracy? As the U.S. continues to use Afghanistan and Pakistan as the front line in its conflict with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, and even more so in transitional mechanisms, state-building and institutional reform, Pakistan will play a key role vis-à-vis terrorism and Islamism.

This paper was written before recent events in Pakistan that may strain US-Pakistani relations, including the release of CIA contractor Raymond Davis, the operation against Osama Bin Laden, and public comments on the Haqqani Network.

Democratization

Popular Consensus: There is a strong popular consensus on democracy. Democracy is valued for many as a process, regardless of whether it is less efficient than a dictatorship. This seems to be shaped by Pakistan's long experience with living under military rule and dictatorships.

Impact of US Past Actions and Promises: Some of the biggest drivers of public opinion are past US actions in the region and current US promises. The US is perceived as having a rhetoric of democracy promotion while simultaneously supporting autocratic regimes and driving instability. Pakistan’s role in the 1980s with the American-led war in Afghanistan is seen as shaping current events and well being in Pakistan on all levels. American support for Israel and the autocratic Middle Eastern regimes that also support Israel is also seen as a big driver of anti-Americanism.

The Judiciary: The judiciary is widely seen as an essential tool to fight extremism, improve governance, increase human well-being and safeguard human rights. It is particularly important because the past military rules and dictatorships have sought judicial cover for their actions. They have pressured the judiciary to issue emergency orders suspending the constitution or legitimating regime action.

Media: The media is perceived as extremely independent and free. There is some debate about whether the media has started to censor itself in response to extremist threats.

The Military: The military is seen as effective but is strongly associated with military dictatorship. Pakistan’s history is fairly evenly broken out between democracy and dictatorship. The military has played an instrumental role in a number of coups that were ostensibly aimed at bad democratic governments. At the same time, most of the military dictatorships are perceived as being worse than even a corrupt democracy. The military is seen as having disproportionate power in the current government. If political governance does not create big changes very quickly, the military is perceived to be waiting in the wings to stage a coup and implement a dictatorship.

Legitimacy by Source: Legitimacy is often conferred by whether a democratic or a dictator government implemented the institution or law. It is unclear whether these concerns would disappear if the government were more effective and less corrupt. Regardless, Musharraf- or dictator-initiated policies or programs have a bad reputation. Many people want them to be reviewed – to convey legitimacy – or for them to be dismantled and rebuilt under a democracy. There is a widely held sense that even a faulty democracy is better than an effective dictatorship. However, not all would agree. Musharraf did pass some positive reforms, such as amending the statutes on sexual assault and rape. His supporters would also argue that he was not a dictator, but instead a duly elected president governing via a “controlled democracy.”

Organization and Support of Parties: Both political Islam and violent extremists tend to be well organized and broad-based, which extends their reach. Pakistan is somewhat unique, because opposition political parties are allowed. These tend to be smaller,

less well-funded, and less sophisticated than the religious parties. The Islamic parties – whether they are simply political Islam or violent extremists – tend to be integrated into entire communities. They offer not just an ideology, but also an entire social network, sense of belonging and wide-spectrum community involvement. They are multifaceted and offer different activities; some have separated but associated militant wings. This is part of their power and their distinction over secular civil society. They are also able to tap into the zakat, the compulsory religious tithing in Islam.

Islamism

Secular Establishment of Pakistan: Pakistan’s current Islamist nature is seen as being at odds with its roots. Because of the tensions with India, Pakistanis are extremely proud of their history of partition. The role of religion in that separation is controversial. Pakistan did separate due to religious differences with India. The classic pictures of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, still in many offices and homes today, show him in Islamic garb. However, Jinnah himself was very secular. He wore Western business suits and was strongly against political Islam. Upon founding Pakistan, he stated, “Pakistan is achieved, now all are equal in the eyes of the law.” But even Jinnah himself, a widely revered and loved figure, felt pressures to use religiosity as a sign of his authority. His advisors convinced him to conduct key public appearances in Islamic dress to reinforce his power and authority. Today, Jinnah is more commonly seen as an Islamic leader, even though the Islamist groups do not refer to him.

Pace of Reform: There is disagreement about what pace and form of debate and reform is best for Pakistani society right now. Some say that the Punjab Governor’s outspoken criticism of the blasphemy laws was a courageous exercise of leadership and a model of liberal values and secularism. Others feel that his actions set the moderation movement back 10 years because society was not yet ready.

Role in Governance: Most think that political Islam will continue to play a limited role in governance systems. While some people see Islam as being an essential part of a state system and government, others do not foresee a rise of political Islam. Religious parties in Pakistan have a very small percentage of the seats in the assembly, in contrast to their much larger street power. This is partially explained by the younger age of street supporters, but also by the fact that religious parties do not emphasize voting as an activity.

Terrorism

Domestic Terrorism Caused by US War on Terror: Domestic terrorism and security is seen as the most pressing issue in Pakistan. The perception is that acts of violent terrorism have only recently become common in Pakistan. People are widely concerned by, and disapproving of, the current extremism. But, this is seen as being caused by America’s war on terror. The majority believes that the government and the army are doing the bidding of the US and that they are killing their own people. The Red Mosque operation in Islamabad (a July 2007 confrontation between the Pakistani army and Islamic fundamentalist militants that led to a significant increase in terrorism and militancy, as well as broken peace agreements by terrorist groups) is also touted as the turning point for terrorism in Pakistan.

Terrorism Supplanting India: It is striking that terrorism has reached relations with India as a foremost issue in many people’s minds. Until recently, Indian-Pakistani relations have been somewhat of a national bogeyman. The mutual distrust is strongly reinforced in the culture, education, and social lives of Pakistanis. Given this strong legacy, it is important to notice that it has been replaced as the top priority in the minds of many Pakistanis.

US in Soviet-Afghan War: US actions in the Soviet-Afghan War strongly shape Pakistani attitudes today. Many Pakistanis believe that extremism was created by US funding of the jihadis, not by Pakistan. Almost all of the people we spoke with, during formal interviews and in informal settings, emphasized the role of US actions in Afghanistan during the 1980s – in “making” Pakistanis fight the war for the US; in “arming, training and radicalizing” the Mujahideen; and in “abandoning” Pakistan and Afghanistan after the war ended. It is an extremely common, and strong, perception that problems with terrorism and extremism can be largely traced to these specific US actions, that the funds provided by the US to the jihadis was what empowered them, and that Pakistan is paying that price today.

Afghanistan: Afghanistan is seen as essential and central to Pakistan’s future and to resolving the issue of extremism and terrorism.

Extremism: There is a lot of uncertainty about what extremism means for Pakistan. Many Pakistanis think that violent extremism is not about religion, but is about power. Moderate political Islam is seen as having an important role to play in the Muslim world. Many also think that terrorism in Pakistan is increasingly a rejection of a secular and a moderate Islamic society – a society that is changing quickly. The overt flogging of the Pakistani woman by the Taliban and the assassination of the Punjab Governor shook some in Pakistan because it challenged assumptions about who is the silent majority. And

after these incidents, the media, religious clergy and communities all seemed hesitant to express disapproval or grief. Previously it seemed that the secularists were the silent majority. Now some are wondering whether it is now, or it always had been, the extremist fundamentalists.

Fighting Extremism: Education, economic development, governance reforms and democratization are perceived as the key tools to fight extremism. Economic inequality is large and growing in Pakistan, jobs and FDI are dropping off and the country is increasingly isolated.

Madrassas: Many in Pakistan believe that fundamental madrassas are spreading extremism and that economics are at the core of these schools. Madrassas in Pakistan have rapidly expanded in the last decade. State-provided schools are still rare and tend to be of lower quality than their private counterparts. Especially in rural areas, madrassas are an attractive option for poor families (they offer free schooling and boarding) and for families that value incorporating Islam into the Pakistani society. Even so, only small minorities of school-age children go to madrassas and many of these madrassas are moderate. Many others preach fundamentalism without promoting violent extremism.

What Extremists are Fighting: Many believe that extremists are externally-oriented and largely responsive to US foreign policy as opposed to ideology. In Pakistan, fundamentalists have shifted focus over time from Afghanistan and the Soviets to Kashmir, and back again after 9/11. US foreign policy is a key tool for shaping support for extremism. Many people believe that Afghanistan must be stabilized in order to fight extremism, and that this will lead to the madrassas moderating. Other than the US, the most important relationships between Pakistan and a foreign country are Afghanistan, India and Iran.

Extremism and Politics: Extremist parties are perceived as being largely apolitical. Many people noted that although extremist parties have visible street power, they have never held many seats in Parliament. Many feel that this will always be the case, although the reasons why are varied. Some feel that extremist parties do not support participating in the political system.

Public Support for Extremism: Recently there has been an important shift in public opinion away from supporting groups like the Taliban. Many people feel that when extremist parties actually have responsibility for governing, they fail and are discredited. Most examples used were those within Pakistan, such as the 2002 MMA forming a government in the Frontier Province that was replaced by liberal moderate parties in the 2008 election. Similarly, many also believe that the Taliban has become less popular in the tribal belt and in Swat because of their failure to provide economic development and public services and because of their human rights violations.

IX. RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations have been redacted to protect client confidentiality

X. APPENDIX

Table A13. Counts of countries covered in surveys.

Country	Count	Country	Count
Afghanistan	18	Egypt	44
Albania	6	Turkey	39
Algeria	4	Indonesia	38
Azerbaijan	19	Nigeria	32
Bahrain	2	Niger	32
Bangladesh	9	Palestine	28
Brunei	1	Pakistan	26
Burkina Faso	3	Jordan	24
Chad	1	Iran	23
Comoros	0	Saudi Arabia	20
Djibouti	1	Lebanon	19
Egypt	44	Azerbaijan	19
Guinea	0	Afghanistan	18
Indonesia	38	Morocco	17
Iran	23	Iraq	16
Iraq	16	United Arab Emirates	15
Jordan	24	Malaysia	10
Kazakhstan	3	Bangladesh	9
Kosovo	3	Mali	7
Kuwait	4	Albania	6
Kyrgyzstan	3	Senegal	5
Lebanon	19	Kuwait	4
Libya	1	Algeria	4
Malaysia	10	Tajikistan	3
Maldives	1	Kyrgyzstan	3
Mali	7	Kosovo	3
Mauritania	2	Kazakhstan	3
Morocco	17	Burkina Faso	3
Niger	32	Yemen	2
Nigeria	32	Uzbekistan	2
Oman	0	Syria	2
Pakistan	26	Sudan	2
Palestine	28	Mauritania	2
Qatar	1	Gambia	2
Saudi Arabia	20	Bahrain	2

Senegal	5	Turkmenistan	1
Sierra Leone	1	Somalia	1
Somalia	1	Sierra Leone	1
Sudan	2	Qatar	1
Syria	2	Maldives	1
Tajikistan	3	Libya	1
Tunisia	0	Djibouti	1
Gambia	2	Chad	1
Turkey	39	Brunei	1
Turkmenistan	1	Tunisia	0
United Arab Emirates	15	Oman	0
Uzbekistan	2	Guinea	0
Yemen	2	Comoros	0

Table A14. Counts of issues covered in surveys.

Tag	Count	Tag	Count
Afghanistan	16	National Policy	90
Al-Qaeda	23	Regime Support	88
Arab State	32	Economy	85
Climate Change	32	Democratization	82
Democratization	82	Elections	71
Domestic Terror	43	US Relations	68
East-West Cooperation	34	Media Consumption	66
Economy	85	Other Powers	65
Education	45	US Foreign Policy	60
Elections	71	Free Media	54
Ethnic Issues	34	Islamism	49
Free Media	54	Education	45
Gender Issues	41	Health	45
Globalization	19	Domestic Terror	43
Health	45	Palestine	42
Human Rights	37	Gender Issues	41
International Affairs	14	Israel	39
Iraq	32	MENA	38
Islamism	49	Human Rights	37
Israel	39	United Nations	36
Media Consumption	66	East-West Cooperation	34
MENA	38	Ethnic Issues	34
National Policy	90	Arab State	32
Nuclear Iran	19	Climate Change	32
Obama	20	Iraq	32
Other Powers	65	Taliban	29
Palestine	42	US Military	29
Personal Relationships	25	Personal Relationships	25
Regime Support	88	Al-Qaeda	23
Taliban	29	Obama	20
United Nations	36	Globalization	19
US Foreign Policy	60	Nuclear Iran	19
US Military	29	US Oil	17
US Oil	17	Afghanistan	16
US Relations	68	International Affairs	14

Table A15. Indicators of democracy in the Muslim World.

	Democracy	Government Effectiveness	Corruption	Elections	Political Part.	Freedom of Speech
Afghanistan		-1.29	1.8	6	7	0
Albania	9	-0.36	2.9	8	11	1
Algeria	2	-0.53	3	4	4	0
Azerbaijan	-7	-0.66	2.1	3	4	0
Bahrain	-7	0.37	5	3	8	0
Bangladesh	-6	-0.8	2	3	5	0
Brunei		0.86	5.5	0	3	0
Burkina Faso	0	-0.83	2.9	5	8	1
Chad	-2	-1.44	1.8	3	1	0
Comoros	9	-1.78	2.6	8	11	0
Djibouti	2	-0.97	2.9	4	5	0
Egypt	-3	-0.43	2.9	1	4	1
Gambia	-5	-0.68	2.3	6	7	0
Indonesia	8	-0.39	2.3	11	13	1
Iran	-6	-0.75	2.5	3	4	0
Iraq		-1.67	1.5	7	6	0
Jordan	-3	0.22	4.7	2	6	0
Kazakhstan	-6	-0.54	2.1	3	3	0
Kuwait	-7	0.19	4.3	4	9	1
Kyrgyzstan	3	-0.75	2.1	5	7	1
Lebanon	7	-0.59	3	4	7	1
Libya	-7	-0.91	2.5	0	1	0
Malaysia	3	1.11	5.1	6	7	0
Maldives		-0.01	3.3	3	4	0
Mali	7	-0.58	2.7	9	12	1
Mauritania	4	-0.7	2.6	9	7	2
Morocco	-6	-0.12	3.5	4	7	0
Niger	6	-0.86	2.6	11	9	0
Nigeria	4	-0.98	2.2	3	9	0
Oman	-8	0.29	4.7	2	2	0
Pakistan	2	-0.6	2.4	2	4	1
Qatar	-10	0.05	6	2	2	0
Saudi Arabia	-10	-0.17	3.4	0	0	0
Senegal	8	-0.34	3.6	9	12	0
Sierra Leone	7	-1.08	2.1	10	12	1
Somalia	0	-2.33	1.4	0	0	


Sudan	-4	-1.15	1.8	0	4	0
Syria	-7	-0.81	2.4	0	0	0
Tajikistan	-3	-0.98	2.1	2	4	0
Tunisia	-4	0.39	4.2	1	3	0
Turkey	7	0.23	4.1	10	12	0
Turkmenistan	-9	-1.17	2	0	0	0
United Arab Emirates	-8	0.77	5.7	1	2	0
Uzbekistan	-9	-0.76	1.7	0	0	0
Yemen	-2	-1	2.5	4	7	0
Regional Avg.	-1.2	-0.5	2.9	4	5.6	0.3
World Avg.	3.7	-0.1	3.9	7.7	10	1

Note: Democracy score is from Polity Score (p_polity2) and ranges from -10 (least democratic) to 10 (most democratic). Effectiveness score is from the World Bank (wbgi_gee) and ranges from -2.5 (least effective) to 2.5 (most effective). Corruption score is from Transparency International (ti_cpi) and ranges from 0 (most corrupt) to 10 (most clean). Elections score is from Freedom House (fh_ep) and ranges from 0 (worst processes) to 12 (best processes). Participation score is from Freedom House (fh_ppp) and ranges from 0 (worst participation) to 16 (best participation). Freedom of Speech comes from the Cingranelli& Richards Human Rights Dataset and ranges from 0 (complete government censorship or ownership) to 1 (partial) to 2 (no government censorship or ownership). Source: Quality of Governance dataset, version March 2010, data from 2007.

Table A16. Where is chief executive or defense minister a military officer?


Afghanistan	Pakistan
Azerbaijan	Qatar
Bahrain	Somalia
Chad	Sudan
Gambia	Syria
Indonesia	Tajikistan
Kyrgyzstan	Tunisia
Lebanon	Egypt
Libya	Burkina Faso
Mauritania	Yemen
Niger	

Source: Quality of Governance dataset version March 2010, data from 2007.

Figure A17. Percentage of women in parliament.


Source: Inter Parliamentary Union, data from January 31, 2011.

Figure A18. Failed States and Political Terror in the Muslim World.



Source: Quality of Governance dataset, version March 2010, data from 2007.

Figure A19. Religious Freedom and Religious Fractionalization.



Source: Quality of Governance dataset, version March 2010, data from 2007.

List A20. Recommended indicators.

Political

Bertelsmann Transformation Index: Stateness, Political Participation, Stability of Democratic Institutions, Political and Social Integration, Resource Efficiency, International Cooperation. At Quality of Governance (www.qog.pol.gu.se) or <http://bti2006.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/>.

Cingranelli & Richards Human Rights Dataset: Freedom of Assembly and Association, Disappearance, Extrajudicial Killing, Freedom of Movement, Freedom of Speech, Torture. At Quality of Governance (www.qog.pol.gu.se) or <http://www.humanrightsdata.org>.

Database of Political Institutions: Regime Type, Years in Office, Finite Term in Office, Years left in Current Term, Chief Executive a Military Officer, Defense Minister a Military Officer, Government Fractionalization, Opposition Vote Share, Mean District Magnitude. At Quality of Governance (www.qog.pol.gu.se) or <http://go.worldbank.org/2EAGGLRZ40>

Economist Intelligence Unit Index of Democracy: Civil Liberties, Democratic Political Culture, Electoral Process and Pluralism, Functioning of Government, Political Participation. At Quality of Governance (www.qog.pol.gu.se) or www.economist.com/media/pdf/DEMOCRACY_INDEX_2007_v3.pdf

Freedom House Freedom in the World data: Civil Liberties, Political Rights, Status, Freedom of the Press, Freedom of Expression and Belief, Associational and Organizational Rights, Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights, Rule of Law, Electoral Processes, Political Pluralism and Participation, Functioning of Government. At Quality of Governance (www.qog.pol.gu.se) or www.freedomhouse.org

Gibney & Dalton Political Terror scale: Political Terror Scale – Amnesty International, State Department. At Quality of Governance (www.qog.pol.gu.se) or www.politicalterror-scale.org

Global Integrity Report: Global Integrity Index, Civil Society Media Access to Information, Elections, Government Accountability, Administration and Civil Service, Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law. At Quality of Governance (www.qog.pol.gu.se) or www.globalintegrity.org

IDA Resource Allocation Index: Gender Equality, Equity of Public Resource Use, Quality of Public Administration, Transparency Accountability and Corruption in the Public Sector. At Quality of Governance (www.qog.pol.gu.se) or <http://go.worldbank.org/FHNU4A23U0>

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance: Turnout, Electoral System Design, Electoral Quotas for Women. At Quality of Governance (www.qog.pol.gu.se) or www.idea.int/vt/index.cfm

Inter-Parliamentary Union: Women in Parliament. At Quality of Governance (www.qog.pol.gu.se) or www.ipu.org

Polity IV: Revised Combined Polity Score, Executive Constraints, Regime Durability, Polity Fragmentation, State Failure. At Quality of Governance (www.qog.pol.gu.se) or www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm

Reporters Sans Frontieres: Press Freedom Index. At Quality of Governance (www.qog.pol.gu.se) or www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=4116

Transparency International: Corruption Perceptions Index. At Quality of Governance (www.qog.pol.gu.se) or www.transparency.org

Treisman: Have paid a bribe in any form. At Quality of Governance (www.qog.pol.gu.se) or http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb/2005

Vanhanen Index of Democratization: Index of Democratization, Competition, Participation. At Quality of Governance (www.qog.pol.gu.se) or <http://www.fsd.uta.fi/english/data/catalogue/FSD1289/index.html>

World Bank: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law, Control of Corruption. At Quality of Governance (www.qog.pol.gu.se) or www.govindicators.org

Social

Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat & Wacziarg: Ethnic fractionalization, linguistic fractionalization, religious fractionalization. At Quality of Governance (www.qog.pol.gu.se) or <http://www.stanford.edu/~wacziarg/downloads/fractionalization.xls>

Deininger & Squire: Gini Index. At Quality of Governance (www.qog.pol.gu.se) or <http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20699070~pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html>

Environmental Performance Index: Access to Adequate Sanitation, Industrial Carbon Intensity, Environmental Burden of Disease, Access to Improved Drinking Water. At Quality of Governance (www.qog.pol.gu.se) or <http://epi.yale.edu>

Fund for Peace: Failed State Index. At Quality of Governance (www.qog.pol.gu.se) or http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=140

OECD Gender, Institutions, and Development Database: Female Activity Rate, Female Wage Employment, Year Women Received Right to Vote. At Quality of Governance (www.qog.pol.gu.se)

UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset: Extrasystemic armed conflict, Interstate armed conflict, Internal armed conflict, Internationalized internal armed conflict. At Quality of Governance (www.qog.pol.gu.se) or <http://www.prio.no/cwp/armedconflict>

UNDP Human Development Report: Human Development Index, Gender Empowerment Measure, Adult Literacy Rate, Life Expectancy at Birth, Youth Literacy Rate, Female Secondary Net Enrollment Ratio. At Quality of Governance (www.qog.pol.gu.se) or <http://hdr.undp.org/>

World Development Indicators: Net Development Assistance and Aid, Foreign Direct Investment, Internet Users, Military Expenditure, Phone Lines, Gender Ratio in School, Income Share for Lowest 20%, Population below national poverty line. At Quality of Governance (www.qog.pol.gu.se) or <http://go.worldbank.org/U0FSM7AQ40>

Economic

Bertelsmann Transformation Index: Market Economy Status, Socioeconomic Level, Private Property, Sustainability. At Quality of Governance (www.qog.pol.gu.se) or <http://bti2006.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/>

Crowe and Meade Central Bank Governance: Central Bank Independence 2006. At Quality of Governance (www.qog.pol.gu.se) or <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/data/wp08119.zip>

Dreher KOF Index of Globalization: Index of Globalization. At Quality of Governance (www.qog.pol.gu.se) or <http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/>

International Monetary Fund International Financial Statistics: Contract Intensive Money, Tax Revenue. At UNDP POGAR (<http://www.undp-pogar.org/resources/statistics.aspx>), www.imfstatistics.org/imf/ or <http://www2.imfstatistics.org/GFS/help/GFShelp.htm>.

United Nations Statistics Division: Growth Rate of Real GDP, Growth Rate of Real GDP per Capita. At Quality of Governance (www.qog.pol.gu.se)

World Economic Forum: Gender Gap Index. At Quality of Governance (www.qog.pol.gu.se) or <http://www.weforum.org/gendergap>

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كلية دبي للإدارة الحكومية
DUBAI SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT

The Dubai School of Government (DSG) is a research and teaching institution focusing on public policy in the Arab world. Established in 2005 under the patronage of HH Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Vice President and Prime Minister of the United Arab Emirates and Ruler of Dubai, in cooperation with the Harvard Kennedy School, DSG aims to promote good governance through enhancing the region's capacity for effective public policy.

Toward this goal, the Dubai School of Government also collaborates with regional and global institutions in its research and training programs. In addition, the School organizes policy forums and international conferences to facilitate the exchange of ideas and promote critical debate on public policy in the Arab world.

The School is committed to the creation of knowledge, the dissemination of best practice and the training of policy makers in the Arab world. To achieve this mission, the School is developing strong capabilities to support research and teaching programs including

- applied research in public policy and management;
- master's degrees in public policy and public administration;
- executive education for senior officials and executives; and,
- knowledge forums for scholars and policy makers.